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Evaluating the Sociology of First Amendment

Silence
by MAE KUYKENDALL*

Introduction
Silence is that curious answer to the riddle, "What is golden and
disappears when you speak its name?" In the context of First
Amendment jurisprudence, Silence is just as puzzling as a riddle.
Silence may be used as a verb, as in, to cause a speaker to cease
speaking or as a noun, as in, the absence of speaking or sound. In
either form, Silence has long been recognized as a rhetorical vehicle
for expression. As it is wont to do, Silence often sits quietly in the
interstices of First Amendment doctrine. But when she speaks, she
roars. When Silence becomes speech, and that speech becomes law,
Silence can get a thumping for its unseemly intrusion.
The thumping of silence as legal doctrine, such as it has been,
was a product of the Court's rescue of the Boy Scouts in Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale2 from an anti-discrimination law that would have
forced the Boy Scouts of America to include openly gay leaders and
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I wish to thank
Bryan Honeycutt, who has been indispensable to the completion of this Article. With
good cheer, he has supplied organization, elegant turns of phrase, useful discussions to
sharpen points, and mugs of coffee. I am also grateful to Professors Anita Bernstein, Burt
Neuborne, and Lawrence Rosenthal for the comments I dragooned them to provide using
the magic of the Internet. I wish to thank Linda Oswald for her clerical support and broad
knowledge for many years at the Law College, and to wish her a happy retirement. I owe
particular thanks to Barbara Bean, whose contribution, as always, surpasseth all
understanding. As usual, any flaws to which the Article remains subject are entirely to be
charged to me personally.
1. When Sir Thomas More refused to publicly accept Ann Boleyn as the new Queen
of England, More relied on the rhetorical principal that, when responding to a
question/demand with silence, the silent party is recognized as answering in the
affirmative. According to More: "The maxim is 'Qui tacet consentire'; the maxim of the
law is 'Silence gives consent.' If therefore you wish to construe what my silence
betokened, you must construe that I consented, not that I denied." ROBERT BOLT, A
MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (Columbia Pictures 1966).
2. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
[695]

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

(Vol. 42:4

boys.3 In Dale, the Supreme Court expanded the right of silence,
originally established in defense of a schoolchild expelled from school
for resisting mandated expression of belief,4 and awarded that right to
a powerful organization alleging that mere association with
homosexuals required it to break its preferred silence about
homosexuality!
The critique here of silence as an element of expressive
association grounded in the First Amendment-and as a doctrine
friendly to power-calls for a quick statement on silence as a term.
The treatment of silence in this Article, which draws heavily on
sociological work, can be elusive. Silence is a complicated form of
communication, often eloquent when chosen but destructive when
imposed. It is golden, soul-killing, and, frequently, an expression of
power. Silence is claimed as a shield but is also imposed as a sword.
Silence is a pervasive factor in human interaction, with groups
signaling to those interacting within a group that silence and caution
about fitting in are necessary. Silence is also a means of expression.
The control over silence in daily interactions among gatherings
emanates from majorities and from persons exercising top-down
authority. In the iconic case on silence, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,6 silence, or a right against compelled speech, is
about a privilege to symbolically retreat from a social demand to
speak that the state seeks to impose on someone who lacks power.
Because silence is a complicated social factor in human
communication, and its uses lie on an infinite spectrum of meanings
and power relations, the Supreme Court is predictably at sea in
attempting to make attributions about silence in First Amendment
doctrine.

3. For the thumping, see Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1819, 1819 (2002) (referring to the holding of Dale as "sheer lunacy"). It should be
noted that, in May 2013, the Boy Scout organization voted to allow "openly gay boys and
teens ... to participate in scouting." Elizabeth Weise, Boy Scouts Vote to Allow Gay
Members, USATODAY (May 27, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
05/23/boy-scouts-gay-vote/2352077/. The extent of the change and the actual practices in
local troops is not clear. Mike Chalmers, Many Unhappy with Decision on Gay Boy
Scouts, USATODAY (May 24, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/
23/many-unhappy-with-boy-scouts-decision/2356607/.
4. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that the
state cannot compel a child to say the pledge of allegiance before class).
5. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640.
6. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
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This Article will demonstrate that the transformation of a
doctrine in defense of a helpless target of state power into a sword for
power is a result of a twist in the "path of First Amendment law"7
from a) a start in Holmesian embrace of a battle model for ideas, b) a
side trip into a strongly "purposivist ' ,8 concern for a vulnerable school
child, and c) the incorporation of the concern for a vulnerable child
into the battle model in which a group with power may pose as a
weak, endangered waif. Part I traces the development of First
Amendment doctrine, starting with a general cultural deference to
sovereign (and local community) power over dissident speech, taking
a turn with a battle qua market metaphor, gaining nuance with the
helping hand extended to the Jehovah's Witness child, and maturing
into a doctrine arming the powerful with a claim to a child's
vulnerability. Part I also discusses other 'doctrines, critically Citizens
United v. FEC,9 that seem to be logical outgrowths of the, First
Amendment marketplace of ideas logic, ° a logic that points to
allowing power to prevail in the "market" for ideas. Part II
introduces the sociology of "silence." My sociological analysis in Part
II draws heavily on the landmark work of mid-twentieth century
sociologist Erving Goffman, who devised an empirical framework,
based on close observation and a literary turn of mind, of the kinds of
social behavior, or social interaction, which he saw prevailing in
contemporary (American) society."'" Using Goffman-style insights
and similar materials, I suggest that the defenses of Dale miss the role
that the First Amendment should play in efforts to increase civic
capacity, including by legislative support in states using anti7. Holmes is renowned for his major work on the "path of the law." See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
8. For a helpful explanation of schools of thought on the correct interpretation of
the First Amendment, see Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the
Inescapable Pragmatism of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011). Rosenthal defines the
"purposivist" approach as hinging on a search for "primacy of governmental motive," or
"the likelihood that the regulation reflects a governmental motive to burden disfavored
speech or speakers." Id. at 2. As will be further discussed, the original meaning of the
First Amendment is often described as "impossible to determine." Id. at 7.
9.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

10. See infra, Part I.A.
11. TOM BURNS, ERVING GOFFMAN 8 (1992). The work of scholars of behavioral
law and economics is also relevant. I recently discovered that in 2003, Cass Sunstein
deployed a vocabulary for analyzing the need of societies for dissent and the risks of
barriers to contact between groups. CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT
(2003).
His terms for capturing the phenomena of "conformity, dissent, and
information"-key concerns of this Article-are discussed infra, Part II.A. Sunstein does
not draw on the vein of sociological work prompted by the work of Erving Goffman.
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discrimination law as a tool to enhance opportunities of wide
engagement and the accumulation of experience through contact.
Building civic capacity as a critical mission of free expression is the
overriding theme of the material presented in Part II. Part III further
develops the argument that an un-sociological doctrine garners
support in part from the gain to the "chattering class 1 2 of doctrines
thought to energize debate among those most blessed with outlets for
speech and public exchange, though the effect on developing a broad
civic capacity among those who lack such blessings for- selfdevelopment and assertions of personal autonomy is likely negative.
A brief conclusion contrasts the Holmesian view of battle, as
combined with the Dale doctrine in allowing the combatants to claim
to be vulnerable, with an alternative view of the First Amendment as
a constitutional support for human development.
I. The First Amendment: From a Holmesian Battle to the
Death Among Warriors in Armor to a Battle Among Warriors
Disguised as Vulnerable Children
The doctrine from which the silence motif in the First
Amendment emerges is the iconic individualistic ode in Barnette to
the soul and spirit of a Jehovah's Witness child. 3 The Court held that
a child may not be penalized for failing to salute the American flag.'
In the elegant pen of Justice Jackson, "[i]f there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. ' 15
Justice Jackson's famous words have reverberated from the time
he wrote them. The words and the form of the protection provided
contribute a deeply purpositivist explanation of the First Amendment
to protect freedom of thought from hostile majoritarian power where
the wellsprings of individual capacity and dignity are most
endangered. They have inspired an admirable vigilance against
12. Anne E. Kornblut, The PeculiarPower of the Chattering Class, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/weekinreview/O2kornblut.html# (discussing
different defintions of the "chattering class" and citing the Oxford English Dictionary
Online definition of the term as "the liberal intelligentsia," but noting that conservatives
are also included in the term).
13. Dale, 530 U.S. at 642.
14.

Id.

15.

Id.
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coerced belief imposed on a vulnerable citizen by an overreaching
state. Yet the doctrine has grown well beyond the impulse of a Court
first finding its way in applying civil liberties principles to the states.
The silence principle now serves as a malleable weapon of the
powerful against the powerless.
A. Barnette to Dale- The Child Becomes a Man With a National Civic
Organization
Because the Dale case is associated in shorthand recollection
with a right of association, and is linked in many minds with the
Boston Irish St. Patrick's Day Parade case, let us begin with a short
explanation of the lineage of Dale, through Hurley v. Irish American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston'6 ("GLIB"), and hence
from Barnette. In Hurley, the organizers of the Boston Irish St.
Patrick's Day Parade refused to permit GLIB to march in the parade
under a banner identifying the group by name. 7 In a unanimous
decision, citing Barnette for the critical point that the State "may not
compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees,"' 8 the
Court held that a parade is a quintessential form of symbolic speech
and is therefore protected from state-mandated inclusion. 9 The
Massachusetts courts had rejected the argument that the parade
expressed anything.' The Court disagreed, saying that a parade
"makes some sort of collective point,"'" and is "a form of expression,
not just motion."22 The Court concluded that requiring admission of a
group marching under a banner identifying them as gay and lesbian
Irish persons "violates the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message." 23
Why, then, might we regard the Hurley parade case as having a
pedigree in Barnette's protection of pure silence and non-speech?
Some understand the Court to say the organizers were sending a
message, so they were excused from sending a contrary message. But

16.
(1995).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 578-81.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 573.
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the core idea is Barnette-the right to refuse to engage in a symbolic
gesture, such as, in Barnette, a flag salute or, in Hurley, the inclusion
of an Irish group carrying a symbol the group does not wish to
display. The structure is the same. Both the Seventh Day Adventist
Child and the Irish parade organizers wished to go about their
ordinary routine without being forced by the state to become the
source of a symbol they do not choose, and which they reject when
the proposition that they display it is brought to them by
representatives of the State.
Likewise, in Dale, the Scouts had no stated rule in their official
documents about gay Scouts. 2 4 When the issue arose because a young
Scout leader had become openly gay at his university, the group
notified him that he was no longer a Scout.25 When the state of New
Jersey notified the Scouts that state anti-discrimination law required
Dale's continued membership, the Scouts claimed a right of silence.
The Scouts' executives reacted like the young child in West Virginia
and the Irish parade organizers-that Dale's continued membership
would constitute a coerced adoption of a symbolic meaning that it did
not wish to embrace." In each case, the claim is to maintain a form of
silence. None of the plaintiffs had been sending a message about flag
salutes, GLIB, or gay Scouts. Rather, they had private, unexpressed
views that did not rise to the level of a matter about which they wish
to make public statements. They wished, rather, to maintain their
own silence. And, in their view, the state wished to end their silence
by forcing them to engage in a symbolic gesture. Each case winds up
treated by the Court as having the same problem at its core-a
tearing away by the state of silence, or circumspection, in favor of a
mandated expression.
Yet, the extent of the resemblance of the organizations'
resistance to a state mandate to the plight of a child forced to make a
physical gesture and speak a pledge is by no means otherwise exact.
With individual roots in protection for a few vulnerable school
children, the Barnette doctrine has grown into a wider-ranging right of
individual speakers, and powerful groups, to reject small, and some
large, impositions that might be argued to make the individual or

24.
25.
26.
27.

Dale, 530 U.S. 669-70.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 645-47.
Id.
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group a message-bearer for the state.2 Many of these cases are
decided with a narrow margin, suggesting that the choice of
characterization of a law as reasonable regulation or a coerced speech
or association is often close-and even malleable. Further, when the
Court chooses to analyze anti-discrimination law that affects
membership in large, unselective entities such as the Boy Scouts, it
overlooks a critical feature of First Amendment analysis-the
determination of whether a law that affects expression is contentbased or content-neutral. Content-neutral laws, according to the
Court, do not pose the same level of risk as do content-based laws of
"excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue."29 The
Court, in one opinion, both explains why content-neutral regulations
may survive if they advance a substantial government interest, and
cites Barnette as standing, seemingly absolutely, for protection from
coerced "utterance of a message favored by the Government."30 Yet
the Barnette line is developed to protect a large organization without
reference to the possibility that anti-discrimination law is content
neutral and advances a substantial government interest. The Court
appears to have separated the two lines of doctrine into separate
compartments, thus providing a bulwark for large organizations that
claim that an effect of rules against discrimination is suppression of
the organization's ideas. The organization is not vulnerable in the
way of a child made an outcast by a state mandate, so the First
Amendment harm, if any, must be something more than the use of
state power to crush the individual's spirit. Yet the Court invokes
Barnette for a large, powerful group with no reference to a sociology
of threat to speech values.
The result is a puzzling trend in the Court's jurisprudence toward
clothing the powerful in the garb of the weak, and thereby enhancing
the power of the strong. Other doctrines in First Amendment
28. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that state cannot
require license plate slogan); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1955) (holding
unconstitutional an oath as a condition to receive veterans benefits); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (holding unincorporated veterans'
group protected from forced inclusion of an identity group carrying a banner); United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (holding that large mushroom grower was
not required to pay fees for a generic advertisement sponsored by the federal
government). But see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
61-62 (2006) (stating that a government mandate requiring school receiving federal funds
to engage in conduct that "includes elements of speech ... is a far cry from the compelled
speech in Barnette and Wooley").
29. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FEC, 512 U.S 622, 642 (1994).
30. Id. at 641.
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jurisprudence also move in the direction of protecting the powerful
from regulations if they fit a First Amendment conceptual slot." The
most visible, and the most contested in popular thought and in
scholarly commentary, is Citizens United.32 It lies at the extreme end
and is the logical outcome of the marketplace-of-ideas conception of
the First Amendment.33 There are other cases that are often
discussed in connection with the slotting by the Court of regulations
of powerful organizations into an attack on the same endangered
subject status as that borne by individual citizens at risk of
government suppression of their speech or rights of expressive
association. A recent empirical paper by Professor John Coates
concludes, on the basis of patterns detected in a data set of First
Amendment cases, that "corporations have begun to displace3
individuals as the direct beneficiaries of the First Amendment."'
Professor Coates's particular concern is the expansion of protection
for corporate speech, in the form of commercial speech, and the
conflation of money expenditures by corporations with speech, and
thus with the effects on the economy of such a "takeover of the First
Amendment by corporations."35 But he is also concerned with the
erosion of a republican form of government by the shift in the First
Amendment away from protecting individuals to protecting large
organizations and businesses.36 For this Article, it should be noted
that, realistically, the Boy Scouts is a business 3 7 sustained by

government help and by free volunteer help.38 It is a business that
31. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313 (rejecting the anti-distortion rationale for
limitations on the use of corporate money to "prevent the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form") (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)); see
infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
32. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
33. I owe a debt to Lawrence Rosenthal for this phrasing. E-mail from Lawrence
Rosenthal to author (Mar. 15, 2015, 8:53 P.M. EST) (on file with author).
34. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data,
and Implications,available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2566785.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id.
37. It is a not-for-profit private corporation. ORGANIZATION OF THE BOY SCOUTS
OF AMERICA, CHARTER AND BYLAWS OF THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Article I,
Section 4 (2014), available at http://www.scouting.org/filestore/pdf/BSACharter-and
Bylaws.pdf ("said corporation shall have no power to issue certificates of stock or to
declare or pay dividends, its object and purposes being solely of a benevolent character
and not for pecuniary profit to its members").
38. Except for necessary professional and administrative personnel, Boy Scouting
from top to bottom is conducted by adult volunteers. They receive no compensation or
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was especially aided in taking on the posture of the threatened sole
child by its identification in some minds with a religious identity-one
that considerably misses the mark in describing the organizational
premises and resources of the Scouts. The Scouts' enterprise
structure is sophisticated and well-tuned, and does not rely for its
wide appeal on religious dogma.39
Some defenses of speech protection for corporations come to
rest on a claim that the corporation is a form of association among
individuals. ° It follows, in that vein of rhetoric, that the right of the
corporation to speak with minimal regulation, or at least only with
regulation that can pass muster under the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence casting those with power as weak, is a
protection for expressive association.4' Yet, Coates points out that
corporations that have gained the protection of the Court have no
underlying expression at all. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,2 the choice
of senior managers of a pharmaceutical marketing firm to make a
First Amendment claim was "not to vindicate the expressive interests
of any individual associated with IMS Health, Inc., but simply to
make it easier for that company, as a business organization, to make
money, at the expense of the privacy of Vermont residents., 43 Coates
notes that, on the facts of the case, in which IMS Health, Inc.,
succeeded in overturning a state law protecting from pharmaceutical
company marketers information obtained from pharmacists about
doctors' prescribing practices, the actual individuals in the
corporation who were in Vermont had an interest in having the data
kept from marketers and held private. 4" The company as a speaker
with expressive interests was an abstraction that swallowed the rights
of actual individuals. The company was without any expressive

material reward of any kind.

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, SAN FRANCISO BAY AREA

COUNCIL, http://www.sfbac.org/training/structure.
39. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562 (1999) ("BSA... does not espouse
any one religion, explaining in the Scoutmaster Handbook that '[t]here is a close
association between the Boy Scouts of America and virtually all religious bodies and
denominations in the United States.' Consistent with its nonsectarian nature, BSA Bylaws
require 'respect [for] the convictions of others in matters of custom and religion."').
40. Larry Ribstein, First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1019, 1021 (2011).
41. Id.
42. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011).
43. Coates, supra note 34, at 31.
44. Id.
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interest, except ones that "were instrumental and linked to...
individual interests only through their profit motive. ' 5
In this way, the parallelism to the Scouts case emerges: Scout
executives claimed a right of expressive association against
individuals who would suffer a loss of state grants of individual rights
as the price for an organizational victory for an expansive First
Amendment claim. 6 Though there were surely Scouting participants
who supported the exclusion, it remains the case that it was the
Scouting executives who chose to litigate and managed opinion in
pursuit of a perceived corporate interest not unrelated to financial
goals. 7 The Scouting organization is a major organization, with many
of the corporate characteristics discussed by Coates in respect of
profit corporations. The Boy Scouts of America's ("BSA") revenue
and compensation expenses satisfy the criteria of a medium to large
corporate entity, making it one of the largest Title 36 Congressional
charters.48 In 2014, BSA was listed as the 28th largest United States
charity, reporting revenue of $1.24 billion and highest compensation
at over $1.2 million. 49 The BSA's size might be compared to the
American Red Cross, another Title 36 charter, that reported $3.5
billion in revenue for 2014 and its highest compensation at over $600
thousand.5' The largest United States charity, United Way, reported
$4.27 billion revenue for 2014 with its highest compensated employee
at just over $1 million. 2 While BSA's revenue falls just outside the
United States' 212 largest private companies that reported between
$2 billion and 134 billion annual revenue, the charity boasts

45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 645-47; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
47. Membership Standards:Status, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, http://www.scouting.
org/MembershipStandards/Status.aspx (explaining the 2013 BSA board's executive
decision to discontinue excluding youth scouts solely on the basis of sexuality in response
to rapidly changing views of Americans and adult Scouts relating to homosexual and
lesbian relationships) (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
48. 36 U.S.C. § 30901 et seq. (2013).
49. The 50 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/boyscouts-of-america (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
50. 36 U.S.C. § 30901 (2013).
51. The 50 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/
american-national-red-cross (last visited Apr. 12, 2015)
52. The 50 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/unitedway/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
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substantial economic resources. 3 It also makes its policy decisions
through a small body concerned with business factors or potentially
idiosyncratic personal preferences. 4 In an April 19, 2014, update, the
executive committee of the Scouts made findings as to the "rapidly
changing attitudes towards sexual orientation."55
Each case-Dale, Hurley, and Sorrell-carries nuances that

support differing generalizations about the way in which individual
interests yield to the interest of an organization posing as a
threatened individual. Nonetheless, the underlying confusion of
personas is a consistent presence in the reasoning about the risk to
expression from government regulations aimed at protecting
individuals, creating civic capacity, and supporting responsive,
republican government. The exact form of the confusion is less
important than a) the confusion and b) the effect on civic capacity of
an amorphous subject status manipulated for institutional interests.
The insistent intrusion of profit-motivated marketers, against the
preference of those whose private information becomes the
marketers' speech, is the fragile expressive interest afforded
protection. The aggressive salesman becomes the endangered
supplicant for judicial aid. The legal masks56 that hide the personae of
the subjects of Court decisions in a cloud of abstraction become
personifications of an abstraction. The personification, instead of
abstractions used to describe human beings, is empty of speech
content but successfully resistant to state regulation and harmful to
individual First Amendment needs.
The Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 7 case provides a further example
of a corporate claim to embody the vulnerability of an isolated
individual. Though Hobby Lobby arises from a different doctrinal
line, a First Amendment protection for religion awarded statutory
additional protection through Fourteenth Amendment congressional
power, it is also an instance of the conflation of a large, wealthy entity
53. Andrea Murphy, America's Largest Private Companies2014, FORBES, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/andreamurphy/2014/11/05/americas-largest-private-companies-2014
(last visited Apr. 23, 2015, 2:18 PM).
54. The Bylaws provide that the Executive Board shall consist of no more than 64
regular members elected annually, ex officio members from each region, appointed youth
members not to exceed five, and two special members. CHARTER AND BYLAWS, supra
note 37, at §2, cls. 1-4.
55. Membership Standards:Status, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, supra note 47.
56. JOHN NOONAN JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (2002).

57.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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with an individual persona. Hobby Lobby is organized as a for-profit
corporation under Oklahoma law.58 In an opinion for the Court,
Justice Alito borrows quotations about corporations from various
sources to blur the distinctive way in which corporations are legally
separate from the human owners and entirely independent of the
personas of officers and directors. 9 The opinion fails to address the
core conception of the corporation: that of the juridical separation of
its legal personality from any human being associated with the
corporation. 6° The concept of limited liability turns on this
fundamental conception of the corporation; conflating it with the
personal concerns and religion of owners or directors erodes any
concept of the corporate veil. Basic doctrine in corporate law teaches
that one must take the consequences that accompany the choice of a
business entity for conducting an enterprise. The Hobby Lobby case
is ignorant of this simple requirement that teaches the necessity of
learning the legal features of a form, making an informed selection,
and then accepting the consequences of the choice.61 Corporate form
delivers the good of limited liability, as it entirely separates the legal
personality of the owners and participants from the entity. 62 As to the
substitution of the individual persona that was the origin of protective
law through Congressional clarification and Court interpretation of
First Amendment principles affecting religion, the concern arose in a
classically individual appeal for protection from government power. 63
The matter at dispute involved the denial of a state benefit to two
employees who had been discharged by a private employer because
they used peyote in a sacramental ritual.64 The state denied these two
religious practitioners unemployment compensation because they
were dismissed for misconduct, the use of an illegal substance. 6' The
Supreme Court ruled that a neutral state law that burdened a
religious exercise did not have to contain an exception in order to
conform to the First Amendment. 66 The result was Congressional
58. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
59. Id. at 2768-72.
60. See generallyid.
61. Id.
62. Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and CorporateGroups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573,
574-82 (1986) (detailing the history of limited liability within corporations in England and
the United States).
63. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
64. Id. at 874.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 890.
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action, intended to afford protection to religious practice, as a
practical matter to persons practicing minority
religious rites or
67
observing minority religious requirements.
Its jurisprudential evolution is not unlike the journey from Court
solicitude for frightened school children being forced to salute a flag
against their conscience to a right of a rich corporation to exemption
from state anti-discrimination law. The movement is from individuals
taking part in a religious rite of their spiritual beliefs to exemption of
a large, profit-making corporation from compliance with a national
law designed to deliver basic medical care without discrimination
against women of reproductive years. Protection for vulnerable
individuals becomes a privilege of opt out from general law for large
enterprises, with little concern for the impact on individual needs for
which legislatures have otherwise provided. Thus, though the holding
in Hobby Lobby is about religion, and has an element of legislative
input, the propensity of the Court to favor the powerful-against the
expressive development of gay young men and boys or the needs of
women of child-bearing age for autonomy and hence expressive
development-is of the same kind.
Finally, Citizens United contains a symphony of First
Amendment jurisprudential instrumentation rendered as a tribute to
a speech market free of regulatory input.
The market both
envisioned and set free is one in which the wealth of monetary
resources is married to discursive wealth, thereby freeing capital to
dominate the modern media and to use the methods of propaganda,
repetition, and bombardment. The freeing of capital is brought into
greater perfection in McCutcheon v. FEC,68 which held
unconstitutional biennial limits on the amount an individual could
contribute in total to federal political candidates.6 9 An earlier case
held that Arizona did not have a sufficient justification to provide
funds on a matching basis, as against privately funded candidates, for
candidates who accepted public funding and abided by restrictive
rules.70 Justice Kagan's dissent aimed directly at the inversion of the
usual bromide that insists that more speech is a First Amendment
good: "Except in a world gone topsy-turvy, additional campaign

67.
(1993).
68.
69.
70.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4
McCutcheon v. FEC, 133 S.Ct. 1242 (2013).
Id.
Ariz. Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
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speech and electoral competition is not a First Amendment injury."71
Justice Kagan was also blunt about the lack of "a decent respect" by
the Court for the objectives of the citizens of Arizona to have
elections that bring into office representatives "accountable to the
many. ,72

The money-as-speech doctrine of the Court does not forbid the
poor from participating in campaigns, or the middle class, or even the
upper middle class. But in a real sense, it may be said to silence them.
Persons bombarded by the roar of a great wind, or a mammoth roar
of water, generally abandon speech or appeal to a deity.73 Some
settings so dwarf the single person, or a collection of people-the
human form-that all fall silent. The crescendo of speech, and
publicized access of a limited class of donors to candidates, brings into
civic space the same kind of silencing roar as the sea in storm, one
that renders fruitless the heretofore common middle class
engagement with contributing "my two cents"74 to the political fray.
The philosopher Stanley Cavell describes the "my two cents"
implicated in the speech of an individual: "Exercising the right to
speak not only takes precedence over social power, it takes
precedence over any particular form of accomplishment; no amount
of contribution is more valuable to the formation and preservation of
community than the willingness to contribute and the occasion to be
heard.. .

."

Cavell discusses the use in the movie Mr. Deeds of the

phrase, "I'd like to put in my two cents."75 Cavell writes:

...[T]he contribution of two cents is one that can
likely be responded to equally by others; it leaves your
voice your own and allows your opinion to matter to
others only because it matters to you. It is not a voice
that will be heard by villains. This means that to
discover our community a few will have to be punched
71. Id. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2845.
73. "And he arose, and rebuked the wind, and said unto the sea, Peace, be still. And
the wind ceased, and there was a great calm." Mark 4:39 (King James ed.) (response of
Jesus to the fear of disciples in the stern of a ship caught in a storm).
74. "My two cents" is said to arise from the contribution by a widow to a church
treasury, to which rich men were showily giving quantities of silver, presumably for social
status. "And there came a certain poor widow, and she threw in two mites, which make a
farthing." Mark 12:42 (King James ed.).
75.

STANLEY

CAVELL,

CITIES OF WORDS:

PEDAGOGICAL LETTERS ON THE

REGISTER OF A MORAL LIFE 206 (2004) (emphasis added).
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out, made speechless in their effort to usurp or devalue
the speech of others. It is a fantasy of. a reasonably
well ordered participatory democracy.
It has its
dangers; democracy has; speech has.76
Cavell concludes that the motion picture, in helping keep "the
perfectionist, utopian register of democracy alive" makes "a
contribution somewhere between two cents and the largest fortune in
the world."77 The Court's treatment of large fortunes as expressively
endangered has the effect in several applications of "punching out"
the wrong person-the average citizen hoping to add her two cents to
democracy and to the learning process of the whole community."
How did the Court find a jurisprudential path to these odd
portraits of the threat to First Amendment freedoms through
regulations that are not, on their face, aimed at suppressing speech,
but at advancing First Amendment interests, and which in fact seek to
maintain value for the "two cents" that help to maintain civic space in
"a reasonably well ordered participatory democracy"?7 9
B. Early Development of the First Amendment: Reaction Against the
King's Power to License Speech, Some Ambiguity About the
Founders' Views on Seditious Libel
In this subsection, I will provide a survey of the early beginnings
of American norms of free speech and the evidence provided by
sophisticated commentary on the history and original public meaning
supporting an interpretation of the First Amendment. I will rely
substantially on the work of historian Leonard Levy, supplemented
by the recent work of law professor Lawrence Rosenthal examining
historical evidence in light of the emergence of "original public
meaning" as a strong factor in scholarly and judicial readings of

76. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
77. Id. The comment of Jesus concerning the comparison of the widow's mite to the
contribution of silver resonates with Cavell's rendering for democracy of "my two cents."
Jesus advised the disciples: "That this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which
have cast into the treasury. For all they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want
did cast in all that she had, even all her living." Mark 12:43-4 (King James ed.).
78. "So there grows up a sort of solidarity of learning, a professorship of things in
general-exactly that, for, in spite of the smile the term may cause, it is 'professors of
things in general,' like Teufelsdr6ckh, that all men in heart must be." LEARNED HAND,
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 8 (1952).

79.

CAVELL,

supra note 75, at 207.
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Constitutional text.8° Some readers who are well versed in First
Amendment history may choose to skim (or skip) this subsection and
go to Part II. This subsection does, however, compare past
approaches to maintaining conformity in enclaves with present day
doctrine that is a subject of this Article.
Levy generally argued that the provenance in history of strong
speech protection was weak. 8' After some years of hearing other
scholars critique his thesis, Levy conceded he may have argued the
point too strongly and so made some revisions in his landmark book,
The Emergence of a Free Press.8 Rosenthal, however, has indicated

that he thinks "the evidence is even more confusing than does
Levy., 83 The brief survey that follows is intended to provide a
context, drawing mainly on the work of these two scholars, for
critiquing the means by which the Supreme Court has shaped an
uncertain original meaning with respect to the silence principle as
used to protect majorities from "expressive" contact with minorities.
The First Amendment is often described as having arisen from
the anger of the colonists over the powers of the English monarchy to
license publications before they could be printed.'
The strong
consensus on that minimum meaning of the First Amendment
supports the Court's absolutism about prior restraints on
publication. 8' The power of the King and Parliament to prevent
speech before it could occur was the most salient ill against which the
First Amendment was aimed.86 Thus, any suggestion of pre-clearance
80. See Rosenthal, supra note 8.
81. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) [hereinafter FREE
PRESS]. See also LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER

SIDE 3 (1963) (asserting that "'prosecution for the cause of conscience" was a frequent
menace in early America).
82. LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 12-13 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 152). Levy explains the critical influence of Blackstone on "the minds of
American framers." The critical distinction made by Blackstone was that "the liberty of
the press.., consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in censure
for criminal matter when published." Id.
83. Email from Lawrence Rosenthal to author (Mar. 15, 2015, 8:53 P.M. EST) (on
file with author).
84.

LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81.

85. "It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment provides that
'Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' That
leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press. N.Y. Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J.).
86. LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 12-15 (explaining the rule of
"Parliamentary privilege" that forbade reporting on Parliamentary proceedings and the
thin protection provided by the difference between prior restraint and criminal
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of speech is anathema to American law.' Yet the human impulse to
restrain disruptive speech before it happens was and is strong. Levy
debunks any notion that the American colonies were the birthplace of
a strong protection for speech. Though there is an image of vigorous
exchange among hardy colonists with strong views, in fact the pattern
was one of enclaves that did not welcome outsiders who brought
dissent with them.89 Here, the story from the past about insular
geographic enclaves anticipates aspects of present day doctrine. The
de facto "licensing" of groups by First Amendment doctrine to veto
state laws and, by the power of exclusion from broadly inclusive
groups, to protect domains of private royalty in contemporary life
from contact with expression implied by identity, relocates the
impulse to censorship away from an official body and into bodies
"licensed" by the Court's silence jurisprudence.
The result,
empirically, is what Justice Brandeis called "enforced silence." 9 The
state does not exercise its sovereign power, gained by winning a battle
that awards dominance to the strongest force, 9 but it permits
"enforced silence" to be a normative rule for groups with power.
Indeed, a good example of practical prior restraint can be seen in
early group exclusions that prevented speech-the power of a
community "to banish or extra-legally punish unwelcome
dissidents." ' 2 The power of a small "enclave" to enforce conformity
made the distinction between legal powers of prior restraint or
punishment mainly a matter for theory. Similarly, the delegation to a
group of the power of exclusion as a protection of conformity in large
civic groups blocks expressive gains through contact before they
occur. The dynamics of small groups that maintain a consensus, as
described by twentieth century sociologists, 93 is a nice fit for
prosecution for seditious libel). One theorist treats "verbal battles and strains" as a part of
"the totality of animal-environment involvements" and concludes: "Hence, there is no
point in trying to preserve a split between physical and verbal forces or strains of conflicts
in human relations for both are equally implicated in the course of recorded history."). C.
D. MORTENSEN, COMMUNICATION,

CONFLICT, AND

CULTURE,

COMMUNICATION

THEORY 281 (1991).
87. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. 713.
88.

LEvY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 16.

89. Id.
90. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
91. See supra notes 28-39. The Holmesian view of speech as battle is supported by
forms of communication theory.
92. LEvY, FREE PRESS, supranote 81, at 16.
93. MORTENSEN, supra note 86, at 276 (1991) (explaining human conflicts as a
"confluence of animalistic urge and ecological necessity ... from a communicative
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understanding small communities in the early American colonies. In
small tight-knit points of proximity and activity, an apparent
consensus is likely to mean domination that is below the surface. 9
Hence, a portrait of amity is often misleading, yet in American
history, as depicted by Levy, there was pressure to maintain solidarity
in communities capable of mobilizing an apparent consensus to
maintain a smooth surface, often by extra-legal means. The legal
treatment of dissent in the wider context of state authority was not
necessarily an improvement, though Levy indicates that judges were
not the agents of suppression one might suspect they would be. 95
Rather, the sources of punishment for speech were governors acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity and popular assemblies using powers to
punish breaches of Parliamentary privilege.'
Thus, where speech is concerned, majorities have been in need of
a judicial check, to restrain a common human impulse to suppress
dissent. Outside that context, it does not follow that majorities
should be generally disabled, where speech is not the subject of laws
passed by legislative bodies. I will address the problem that may arise
when judges project into the twentieth century regulatory work of
majorities a purported infringement of the First Amendment, though
the affected regulations may be supportive of a First Amendment
mission of building civic capacity. As seen in this subsection,
majorities have a track record of temptations in the way of speech
suppression; the judicial role to check that temptation is important,
but its extension beyond that is less well founded."
Levy describes a libertarian impulse in the United States only
emerging belatedly as compared with the sentiment in England.98 He
connects the emergence in the United States to the Jeffersonian
recognition of a threat from the enactment by the Federalists of the
Sedition Act as part of a plan to control public opinion to assure the
Federalists' re-election.' According to Levy, the Sedition Act, in
contemporary parlance, moved the goal posts for a libertarian
defense of free speech, since it incorporated protective principles for

standpoint . . . viewed as expressed struggles over the distribution of scare resourcesmaterial, economic, and symbolic").
94. Id.at 281.
95. LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 17.
96. Id. at 17-23.
97. See infra Part I.D.
98. LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 297.
99. Id.
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which libertarians had fought, such as proof of intent and jury trial.'"
The result was that, in their own defense, the Jeffersonians embraced
a newly broad view of freedom of speech, particularly for political
advocacy.' °' Finally, Levy concludes his important review of the
American history of free speech, with its twists and turns among
battlers bent on erasing the opposition and the facts of "everyday
life" in communities with the power to expel outsiders, with a shrug."°a
So far as the First Amendment goes, "[w]hat [the framers] said is far
more important that what they meant. '0 3
In the twentieth century, the Court moved to a vision of a
competition of ideas in a free market. The history of the American
understanding and practice of free speech, before the twentieth
century, validates a vision of a contest, but also supports a
sociological understanding of the importance of group interactions to
the apportionment of expressive capacity.
The ecological/
evolutionary theory of communication talks of "the survival of the
expressively most fit but also the disappearance of the least
articulate."' ' History, later doctrine (infra Part I.B), and ecological
evolutionary theory converge in an understanding of a competition in
the area of speech, with variation in the overall explanation of
conflict, but with convergence on a sense that winning is a function of
power in an unregulated struggle.
The late Edwin Baker sought to reframe First Amendment
doctrine less pugilistically-with an explicit normative mission. As
have others, he sought to move doctrine away from a model of
laissez-faire market competition to a set of markers bounding a single
realm of liberty and self-expression and self-determination.'
Arguments Baker fashioned appealed to "modern social theory,"'1
the sociology of knowledge,' 7 and psychoanalytic considerations,"°
none of which has a presence in Supreme Court's First Amendment
doctrine. Indeed, to the extent the marketplace doctrine contains a
progression in jurisprudence by incorporating psychological thinking,

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 149.
Id.

104.

MORTENSEN, supra note 86, at 287.

105.

C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.

(1989).
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it is that of the battle-scarred Nietszchean on the American high
court, the Magnificent Yankee, Justice Holmes. Yet the aspiration of
the First Amendment, in the words of the Supreme Court, is not to
winnow speakers but to empower all citizens to contribute to political
choice: "The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment and a necessary means to protect it."' '° The complexity
of language as a product of human interaction, even where the fittest
survive, suggests that the Court may need better guidance than
constitutional bromides about how it can achieve true neutrality in
regulating ground rules for free expression.
C. Holmes, the Sovereign, and the Field of Combat
The previous subsection addressed the tentative beginnings of
the First Amendment as constitutional doctrine protective of free
speech against the perceived interests of the sovereign. For purposes
of this section, it is sufficient to recall that the Court was slow to see a
role to overrule the judgment of the legislature, if the legislature
deemed speech to be dangerous to the state or to public peace and
order."0 The Court did not second-guess the legislative assessment of
danger. " '
In early cases, the Court affirmed convictions for speech that
today seems tame."2 Justice Holmes is widely seen as a shaping figure
in the evolution of the First Amendment toward the more protective
form it began to take in regard to speech thought dangerous to the

109. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
110. See infra Part I.B.
111. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925) ("By enacting the present statute
the State has determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the
overthrow or organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical
to the general welfare and involved such substantive evil that that they may be penalized
in the exercise of the police power. That determination must be given great weight. Every
presumption is to be indulged in the validity of the statute."). In Gitlow, the Court, upon
applying the First Amendment to the states, articulated an extremely deferential
reasonableness standard that allowed the State to punish those who abuse the freedom of
speech in ways "inimical to "the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to
crime, or disturb the public peace." Id. at 667.
112. See generally Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (upholding Eugene Debs's conviction under the
Espionage Act for speaking against the draft and war recruiting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding two similar convictions under the Sedition Act of
1918).
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sovereign.113 In the material that follows in this subsection, I give
considerable attention to the ideas that helped animate Justice
Holmes's contribution to twentieth century judicial thinking about
how to assess the danger of speech to the existing political system or
guard against the possible existence of an immediate threat to public
peace and safety. Some may differ with an approach that plumbs
Justice Holmes's private beliefs for commentary on the judicial model
that over time emerged from his influence. One reader of a draft of
this Article commented: "What is most important for your purposes,
it seems to me, is that the strong and powerful are most likely to
prevail in the marketplace of ideas."11 4 Justice Holmes is the Supreme
Court judicial source of the notion that a marketplace of ideas is a
testing ground for speech that provides a degree of protection against
bad ideas."' For readers who regard the marketplace concept as a
sufficient statement of the governing conception, the material on
Holmes may be unnecessary to the primary claims. For others, the
agnosticism of Holmes about any means of establishing which values
should be accepted as superior over other values-except force-may
be of interest in assessing the trajectory of legal reasoning as a set of
surface understandings and rationales implicated in judicial
contributions. Even for those who dismiss judicial biography as
lacking explanatory power in law, information about what a towering
judicial figure, especially one of an intellectual and literary bent,
might have thought about the reasons for a doctrine is not alien to the
understanding of the operational import of the doctrine.
Justice Holmes readily and casually participated in the early
holdings, applying his general view that a dominant force-the
state-could crush opposition as a normal expression of power
confronted with a difference of opinion."6 Under the influence of a
113. See generally THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: How OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES CHANGED His MIND-AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICA (2013).
114. E-mail from Lawrence Rosenthal to author (Mar. 15, 2015, 8:53 P.M. EST) (on
file with author). See also Anita Bernstein, Abuse and HarassmentDiminish Free Speech,
35 PACE L. REV. 101, 127 (forthcoming 2015) ("Contemporary decisional law about the
constitutional right to free speech tends to favor overdogs.").
115. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
infra note 145 and accompanying text.
116. Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW. HIST. REV. 661 (2012);
DAVID A. HOLLINGER, THE "TOUGH-MINDED" JUSTICE HOLMES, JEWISH
INTELLECTUALS, AND THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN ICON, in THE LEGACY OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 223 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992) (noting his
friendships with Felix Frankfurter, Harold Laski, and Louis Brandeis).
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young group pressing him to move the Court away from economic
due process and to protect expression,"7 Holmes began to rethink his
views on expression but did it in his own frame-that of battle. As is
widely celebrated, Justice Holmes began to articulate the means by
which the Court might begin to restrain the long-standing impulse of
societies to silence dissenters from state power as exercised
responsively to the strongest interests in the political system."'
Holmes identified the risk of harm from speech as the analytic key to
the Court's application of First Amendment protection of speech. 19
Before that, the Court had suggested fearfulness as the grounds for
First Amendment jurisprudence: Even the tiniest spark might become
a conflagration.'20 Justice Brandeis countered such rhetoric with an
appeal to the courage of the founding generation, a generation that
did not live in fear:
[t]hose who won our independence by revolution were
not cowards. They did not fear political change.... If
there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence. 2'
Over time, the Court integrated these insights about risk assessment
and civic confidence into its governing jurisprudence: the assessment
of "incitement" should be evaluated in light of intention, imminence,
and likelihood. 2 2 The ultimate expression of that confidence in the
value of speech and intrepid refusal to make fear the guide to citizen
speech rights occurred when the Court refused to enjoin the
publication of the Pentagon Papers, despite an understanding that the

117.

See generally Snyder, supra note 116; HOLLINGER, supra note 116, at 223;

HEALY, supra note 113.
118. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote a landmark work, FREEDOM OF SPEECH

(1920), that is credited with "earn[ing] him a permanent place in the pantheon of civil
liberties." DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND

LAW 1 (1986). In the area of free speech, Chafee is described as having reacted against
state legislation passed on behalf of wealth against collectivists. Id. at 79.
119.

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).

120. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.
121.
122.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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release could harm national security interests and cost lives." 3 This
part of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is sturdy, well
accepted, and an advancement of the understanding of the value of
speech.'
The commitment to speech over a desire for conformity
and safety is so strong that the Court is willing to take on moral risk:
Their protection of speech could cause some harms to eventuate, as
they are often warned.'25
Unfortunately, the emotional habit of steeling themselves to the
possible harms of speech may have gained a grip that leads some of
the Justices to scant the human costs of other, less obvious upshots of
strong, even dogmatic judicial applications of First Amendment
doctrinal innovations.'26
The less obvious applications include
protection of speech that harms vulnerable people and defenseless
128
The Court rejects all efforts to limit hate speech,
creatures.'
applies its black letter law logically and mechanically to hamper legal
protections for animals used in "crush" videos,'129 and refuses to allow
states to fashion laws that protect families of fallen soldiers from loud
hate speech aimed at the funeral rites of their lost sons, wives,
brothers, fathers, or other loved ones. 3 ' Professor Burt Neuborne has

123. N. Y Times, 403 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting soldiers'
deaths could result from publication of stolen documents about the Vietnam War).
124. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
125. The warnings to the Supreme Court are reflected in the dissenting opinion
discussed in supra note 123.
126. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. In RA. V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Supreme Court held that
speech that lies within a categorically unprotected genre-fighting words-nonetheless
may not be censored selectively. The import was that the government may not, as the City
of St. Paul had done, single out for punishment forms of expression placed on public or
private property, such as a burning cross or Nazi swastika, that were "bias-motivated." Id.
at 392. The ruling makes it almost impossible to regulate hate speech without also
regulating protected speech.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (striking down federal law
criminalizing the distribution of "crush video" depictions of cruelty to animals for
consumption by sexual fetishists).
130. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (vacating a nuisance judgment
against offensive and insulting protesters at military funerals); see also Brown v. Entm't
Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (striking down California law limiting children's
access to violent video games). The Supreme Court has allowed the majority to limit
disfavored speech on multiple occasions. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
(permitting school principal to punish a student for a sign at a school event that might
"reasonably" be read to promote drug use); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
(limiting the speech rights of public employees); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006)
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reviewed these cases scathingly, featuring them as examples of the
Court's jurisprudence that fails to capture "Madison's Music" in the
First Amendment.' 3' Neuborne suggests that the Court consistently
shapes First Amendment law to benefit the powerful at the expense
of the weak.132
The scanting of the weak for the powerful-or lustily loudvoice is not entirely without a paternity in the fierce philosophy
embraced by the justice so celebrated for setting the First
Amendment on its twentieth century course away from the right of
the state to suppress opposition. Justice Holmes, above all, believed
in the notion of "might makes right," and in the lack of ultimate
validity for any belief.'33 The only test of a belief, for Mr. Justice
Holmes, was its fate on a battleground." Holmes emerged from
serving as a young soldier in the Civil War without a commitment to a
set of beliefs, but with a valorization of war."' Holmes treated as
sacred the fight among soldiers'36 who will throw away their lives in
the service of a cause that is wrong, or trivial, or incoherent.'37
Similarly, Holmes believed that, in politics, sovereign will, backed by
power, was the only basis for law.'38 In the United States, with a
political system wedded to a majoritarian basis for policy, the
Holmesian elevation of power as the basis for law, and Holmes's oftexpressed rejection of any grounding of values in anything other than
(permitting denial to certain prisoners of all non-religious written materials on the grounds
of deference to a rational policy devised by prison officials).
131. See generally BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON'S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2015).

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
Id.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Soldier's Faith, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:

SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 90-91 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1997)

(praising soldiers who die for "a blind belief" and calling the message of war "divine").
136. Id.
137. Peter Gibian, Opening and Closing the Conversation, in THE LEGACY OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 207 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
138.

ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND

LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 14-30 (2002) (reviewing the evidence of Holmes's "powerbased philosophy"); Gibian, supra note 137, at 211 (demonstrating Holmes's conflation of
truth with power, and describing Holmes's view of majority rule as the equivalent of a
dominant national power). See also CHARLES ROYSTER, THE DESTRUCTIVE WAR:
WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, STONEWALL JACKSON, AND THE AMERICANS 283

(1991) (noting the view that Holmes's soldier metaphor meant that "the powerful state,
not ideas or principles, was the ultimate recourse in politics").
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a personal preference,139 pointed toward a war of ideas in which the
most powerful speaker would win, and win rightly because power is
the measure of values.14 ° But, of course, our political system is not

purely majoritarian, so the question of power is not a pure proxy for
the majority. Winners in particular areas have types of clout to make
policy"' and then resources to take losses to the Supreme Court for
relief.14'2 Hence, the concern in this Article about the capture of the
First Amendment by forces of power for interests that are not a clear

win for speech is not a concern about majoritarian power, but instead
about a new kind of domination of political and constitutional

outcomes.
Evidence suggests that private power, less than
majoritarian electoral power, is increasingly the sole currency of our
common political life.
The metaphors Holmes used in his great First Amendment

dissents have to do with battle, in Peter Gibian's phrase, "a verbal
model of battle," of "conflict based on power., 143 The direct path in
Holmes's mind from the logic of "kill[ing] heretics" or "whip[ping]
Quakers," which is acceptable if a group is certain of truth, leads to a
battle among ideas, in a clash almost as exhilarating and life affirming
as all-out war.1 44 In his landmark dissent in Abrams v. United States,
ALSCHULER, supra note 138, at 26.
140. Id. (rejecting rights as only an imaginary prophecy of how public force will be
used against those who attack the right); see also ROYSTER, supra note 138, at 283
(characterizing Holmes as seeing the outcome of the Civil War, not as a triumph of natural
rights, but as a result of the "will of the powerful").
141. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and A verage Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 564 (2014):
139.

Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized
groups representing business interests have substantial independent
impacts on United States government policy, while average citizens
and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent
influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of
Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but
not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian
Pluralism.
142. Adam Liptak, First Amendment, 'Patron Saint' of Protesters, Is Embraced by
Corporations,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24
/us/first-amendment-patron-saint-of-protesters-is-embraced-by-corporations.html.
143. See Gibian, supra note 137, at 212.
144. Id. at 212 (quoting Holmes as writing to Harold Laski, "it seems logical to me in
the Catholic Church to kill heretics and [for] the Puritans to whip Quakers") (citing THE
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND

HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935 217 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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Holmes presents a bracing image of a good reason to allow combat
among ideas:
. . . [W]hen men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.
Here, Holmes refers to his own experience of fighting in war. Joining
the Grand Army of the Republic out of a belief in abolitionism, the
experience of war taught Holmes that the ideas receded, but the
"soldier's faith" in the honor of combat remained.' 46 His sense of
values after the War have been described as Nietzschean,
existentialist, and skeptical. 147 Gibian also comments on the focus in
Holmes's writings on martial figures.'4 8 Holmes confirms his comfort
with power imposed in the combat of ideas and maintained by force:
"If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way. 14 9 Thus, in the tracing to a Holmesian idea of
force meeting force, and ideas battling for dominance, there is little
room to admit concern for the ability of the strongest speakers to
drown out weak speakers, inflict isolation or harm on isolated groups
subject to social disfavor, or gratuitously traumatize the survivors of
fallen soldiers.
As to equality as a constitutional norm for judicial enforcement,
which might also serve to enable weaker voices to be heard or to be
part of a community that would rather, in Holmes's oft repeated
proposed resolution of difference, "kill them," Holmes was scathing:

145. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
146. ALSCHULER, supra note 138, at 146-47.
147. Id. at 6, 18-20.
148. See Gibian, supra note 137, at 198.
149. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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[D]eep seated preferences cannot be argued aboutyou cannot argue a man into liking a glass of beerand therefore, when differences are sufficiently far
reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let
him have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with
admitting that, so far as appears, his grounds are just
as good as ours."'

It is hard to imagine Holmes seeing the reason to require a group
to associate with those whom it might prefer to kill, or, for that
matter, intervening to protect them from the associations mandated
by state law. 15' The core of his work is not about attending to
anyone's sensibilities-not the isolated boy or young man excluded

from a civic group for boys, not the Jehovah's Witness child made to
salute the flag, and not, for that matter, a homophobic Scouting
corporate leadership or a religious entity loath to complete a form to
opt out of direct involvement with contraception. It is about battle,
with ideas doing the work of the martial spirit. Though Holmes's
argument for the clash of ideas as a First Amendment charge speaks

of a test of truth, Holmes is not suggesting the Miltonian idea of
Truth,52 but rather the solution, or end, certified by the winner in
combat. The twentieth century merger of the Holmesian vision of the
First Amendment as a conscription of speech for battle with a tender
concern for the spiritual vulnerability of a child made to do a stiff-

armed salute to the flag leaves the First Amendment in a state of
schizophrenia.
Holmesian vision began its most vigorous
jurisprudential life as a statement of a soldier's attachment to battle
and the survival of the fittest. Next, the First Amendment, breathed
150. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918).
151. For the weak individual, Holmes's contempt was scalding. He famously called
the Equal Protection Clause "the last resort of constitutional arguments" in the course of
upholding the right of the Commonwealth of Virginia to sterilize a young woman who had
been labeled a mental defective. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Gibian
explains that Justice Holmes favored protecting labor unions when they had threatened
the railroads and, by contrast, the railroads when the government prosecuted them under
antitrust law, in both instances as a consistent expression of support for the strong to allow
them to fight the "struggle for life." Gibian, supra note 137, at 212-13 (contrasting
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92,106-09 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and N. Sec. Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
152. John Milton, Areopagitica, in AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF JOHN MILTON 45 (John Alvis ed., 1999) ("And though all the winds of

doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously
by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?").
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life by the martial spirit of Holmes, with the old warrior gone from
the Court, detoured to protect the inner life of a vulnerable child
from state coercion. In old age, the creation of Holmes called upon
the ghost of the pacific and silent school child in aid of the strong to
reject the weak, and summoned the favorites of Holmes-the hardy,
the strong, the robust, the battler-to array their forces in the field of
battle.
D. The First Amendment: From Fearing the King's Power to License
Speakers to Licensing the King's Fear of Powerful Speakers?
As we have seen, societies and groups often have an instinct to

enforce silence.'53 Counter principles are easy to state about the right
of dissenters to speak and publish incendiary ideas, yet so long as a
state interest in suppressing some speech as intended, dangerous, and
imminent is conceded to exist,'

there is room for the Court to err in

setting the pragmatic balance that Rosenthal argues is embedded in
the First Amendment. "5 And once the Court departs from the
straightforward purposivist program and begins to forbid state
interventions that are motivated to open discursive space to spread
social knowledge, it is at risk of scanting First Amendment values in a
way that slights other public interests in a free exchange of ideas.

Silence inflicts damage on those who fear a group and those in society
who would benefit from its insights and presence.

The Supreme

Court is formally protective of speakers and the Court is vigilant to
stop regulations that may prefer certain speakers over others. 56 Yet
153. See generally ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE: A
THEORY OF PUBLIC OPINION-OUR SOCIAL SKIN (1984) (examining the complex social
forces that lead to individuals to fall silent).
154. Brandenburg,395 U.S. 444.
155. Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 1. In his book on jurisprudence, Richard Posner has
explained that there is space in jurisprudence between the dictates of logic and the judge's
personal will, as Holmes intimated were the only alternatives, and it lies in "science and
practical reason." Summarizing Holmes's core view that Holmes did not have the
patience to execute, Posner writes: "Science can make law more rational by enabling the
weight of competing considerations to be measured more precisely than the existing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
methods of legal inquiry permit."
JURISPRUDENCE 251-52 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE].

156.

See, for example, Justice Kennedy's discussion in Citizens United v. FEC:
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when
by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to

speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to
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the effect of the silence doctrine is unexamined for the production of
an engaged, empowered citizenry, and the distribution of silence
versus speech. The silence doctrine of the Court becomes an
influence on a process by which voices are lost to discourse.
The history of suppression of expression is a story of the state
seeking to impose silence to maintain uniformity of belief in a period
when truth could not be subject to difference."' Given the strength of
belief in religious truth, and the eventual designation of the King of
England as the head of the established church, "nonconformity and
'
heresy" were conflated with "sedition and treason."158
While the
suppressive impulse was directed against the individual conscience,159
the technique was to impose a widely shared and accepted,
instinctual, customary demand for silence. As Leonard Levy lays out
the history of "freedom of speech,' '.. it was a slowly dawning
realization among human beings that group understandings,
expressed through state power to silence non-conforming citizens,
were not properly immune from contact with other expressions
imbedded in the expressive activities of carriers of a distinctive
identity.'61 The habit of the state, accepted as a natural expression of
communal consensus through the person of a monarch or a selfgoverning body, was to guard the formation of community by
insisting upon "Reserve and Respect" in speech about the state
orthodoxy. 62 The elevation of enforced silence, demanded by large
private associations, to that of a constitutionally protected barrier
against forms of state regulation that bring into the association
carriers of an identity thought to express "nonconformity and
heresy," provides a strange echo of the silencing power once assumed
to belong to the state. Instead of state suppression, the power is
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The
Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right
and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are
worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and
the speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
157. LEVY, FREE PRESS, supranote 81, at 5.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. LEvy, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 5.
162. Id. at 4-5 (noting Machiavelli's phrase regarding the correct manner to speak of
the Prince when exercising his grant of "liberty to have and sustain the opinions which
please him best") (internal citations omitted).
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assigned to groups under the principles of "freedom of speech" joined
to free association to become freedom of expressive association. The
path from the King's fear of subversive speech, which supported both
licensing and criminal prosecutions for seditious libel, to a
constitutional principle "licensing" large groups to demand silence
out of distaste for difference is one mapped out by the human instinct
to avoid open discourse and to isolate and ignore minorities and
outsiders. But the First Amendment's mandate is to stand as a
fortification protective of those whom the powerful wish to silence or
disable from full participation in societal exchange. It is at least
anomalous for the First Amendment to help build a barrier to access
by the weak to the speech and associational resources of the strong.
Though some group-protective cases protect organizations that
existed for the defense of outsiders,'63 the free floating principle of
silence as a First Amendment value is not reliably protective of weak
voices or the dignitary benefits of access to community assets.
It is worth noting that the frequent refrain about weaker groups
is that forcing them to admit hostile outsiders is a disabling violation
of their associational rights and their right of solidarity in which to
form and communicate ideas. The concern is that weaker groups
need a doctrine at hand to protect them from being molested by
majoritarian intruders intended to crush their capacity to form and
send messages-the threat of what we might term "associational
identity theft." Marginalized groups often wish to claim "our place"
as a protected haven for building confidence and identity, and
maintaining privacy about views of the majority, when desired. In
effect, such an impulse argues for solidarity over engagement.
Herbert H. Denton, Jr., a Harvard College student in 1963 and
later a distinguished journalist, opposed the formation of an exclusive
African and Afro-American Society there, in these words:
Negro students coming to the University are likely to
be overwhelmed with the idea, promoted by the only
"official" Negro organization on the campus, that even
the most liberal and interesting white students they
may meet cannot possibly understand them, and may
even be hypocrites-that the only place they are truly
among friends is in an all-Negro organization strongly
influenced by black nationalism. Such an outcome
163. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-DiscriminationLaw After Dale:
A TripartiteApproach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1541 (2001).
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drastically curtails their ability to benefit from the
central Harvard experience of association with and
exposure to the broadest possible spectrum of people,
ideas and movements. One may seriously ask whether
an organization that so functions is in anyway
compatible 6 with the educational ideals of this
University.' '
Harvard chose in 1963 not to permit the exclusion of other students
from the African-American organization on the basis of race.16 ' The
decision was a private one, but it was made by a university committed
to the values of free expression, an open environment for engagement
and peer learning, and exchange of ideas.1' 66 The University is
generically committed to maintaining a university community. 67 In
such a community, the wish of groups for the right to enforce formal
exclusions in support of solidarity and against counter speech within
the group necessarily lacks normative support from those guiding the
life of the university. The aspiration of universities to foster a rich
community of engagement is a good model for a societal aspiration to
great contact among disparate groups and identities.
Further,
marginal or weaker identity groups have a rich array of private
forums for forming solidarity-the family, the church, the voluntary
private gathering, the enclaves of geographic segregation, and so
forth. The threat of invasion tends to be minor.
Churches are heavily segregated by race.1 6 Gay and lesbian
centers do not find themselves inundated by anti-gay advocates who
164.

Randall Kennedy, Introduction to BLACKS AT HARVARD: A DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AT HARVARD AND RADCLIFF, Xxv

(1993) (quoting Herbert H. Denton).
165. Id. at xxvi.
166. The Houses at Harvard are carefully planned and renewed to create a community
experience for undergraduates, with involvement by the Faculty of Arts & Sciences in the
design of a learning community for students. See House Renewal Ready for Launch,
HARVARD GAZETTE (July 12, 2012), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/stoiy/2012/07/house
-renewal-ready-for-launch/ ("The Houses have been and must continue to be carefully
curated communities, evolving as our students and the world around them change. As we
change the buildings to meet the current and future needs of our students and programs,
we recommit ourselves to Harvard's House system, a truly life-changing institution rooted
in people and what they can learn from each other. The Houses are the heart of the
student experience at Harvard.").
167. Id.
168. Michael Lipka, Many U.S. Congregations Are Still Racially Segregated, But
Things Are Changing, FACrTANK (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/

2014/12/08/many-u-s-congregations-are-still-racially-segregated-but-things-are-changing-2/
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spend large amounts of time attempting to take over the mechanisms
for gay solidarity. There is not a known instance of outsiders
converting a gay haven into a dating service for Christian singles.
Much segregation by identity occurs informally and is supported by
historic legal and economic systems that have sorted people into
separate spaces over time and thereby limited the opportunities for
engagement across identities.
The tendency toward separation into identity silos, caused by
habit and the continuing effects of sorting in space, provides large
opportunities for the creation of close-knit communities built around
identity and immune to proximity and engagement with differing
identities and perspectives, all achieved by the voluntary sorting
choices of people. Further, within such silos, self-censorship plays a
role in limiting the challenge to identity-focused consensus. Hence,
the First Amendment is not a critically needed support for
communitarian bonds to be formed. The silence doctrine, applied
without a sociological consideration of the balance between solidarity
and engagement, by context, inverts the purposivist jurisprudence of
the First Amendment, which seeks to guard the individual or group
against improperly motivated state censorship. Here, it permits the
powerful to step in for the state and do the suppressive work of
hostile motivation. As formal state silencing of gay people, often
through mandated invisibility, became obsolete as law, the work has
been preserved in civic organizations. Silence as an affirmative First
Amendment right of large civic organizations lies a large conceptual
distance away from the gradual rejection, over time, of the deeply
rooted power of the state to suppress dissent, and thereby to mandate
silence on matters of state.'69
Civic space is the neglected concern of the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence.
If the right of associational free
expression is robustly enforced across organizations of many kinds to
permit exemption from anti-discrimination law, the civic space for
engagement is made small, with less supplementation to the informal
segregationist tendencies of groups. Intergroup knowledge dwindles.
The majority suffers from self-imposed narrowness of social
(summarizing data from the National Congregations Study that show that "while about
eight-in-ten American congregants still attend services at a place where a single racial or
ethnic group comprises at least 80% of the congregation, one-in-five now worship in
congregations where no single racial or ethnic group predominates in such a way").
169. LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 81, at 4 (noting the absence of evidence that
"even the most libertarian among the Greek suffered oral or written sedition to exist with
impunity").
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knowledge, with the most damaging effects being imposed on those

whom majorities most often isolate or reject.
E. The First Amendment Today: Dale's Iconography as a Doctrine
Calling the Strong Weak, To Keep Them Strong, and Other
Doctrines
The hardiest contemporary growths of the right not to express
anything occur as a group-protecting doctrine that enables
organizations to resist inside difference or outside inspection of their
messages and their membership and to fend off coerced associations
that affect expression.17 ° Dale both typifies and advances the doctrine
by applying First Amendment "silence" analysis to disallow state laws
that force the Scouting organization either to welcome open gayness
without protest or, in the alternative, to prove to the government that
Scouting's core message cannot tolerate the expressive pressures of
openly gay Scouts. Forcing an organization into such a choice
compromises its right to not speak on a subject about which it chooses
to remain silent.1 7' The positioning of a powerful organization as in

need of protection from an identity deemed inherently expressive is
compatible with other Court doctrines in defense of the speech of the
powerful. The Court's willingness to protect the strong and weak
alike through the rubric of associational rights, thereby shielding

170. The right of organizational silence is a gloss on a number of cases that have arisen
in various contexts and have been explained by commentators using various frameworks.
The common element in the cases is a libertarian insistence by the Supreme Court that an
organization may not be conscripted by the state to carry a message that it dislikes. See
OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 68 (1996) (explaining the rationale for Pac. Gas
& Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm., 475 U.S. 1 (1986)). In Pacific Gas, the Court held that a
power company may not be required to carry a public service announcement in a mailing,
even though the regulation requiring it did not impose a cost on the utility. Id. at 20-21.
Because the claimed risk to the power company of requiring the mailing is one of "forced
association" or "false attribution," the ruling is generally described as a right against
forced association or a right against false attribution and not one of the right not to speak.
See FISS, supra note 170, at 68. However, given that the power company could avoid false
attribution by printing a disclaimer, a gloss developed to explain Dale, and with origins in
earlier right-not-to-speak cases, is useful to explain Pacific Gas. Id. at 69. The power
company is given the right not to speak at all on the subject of the mailing: It need not
disclaim sponsorship of the view to avoid false attribution or apparent association. It can
remain silent. Professor Carpenter has explained the Dale case in a similar fashion: The
Boy Scouts are not required under the Court's holding to account for their organizational
policy on homosexuality in order to claim a right to exclude gay Scouts. They can be
entirely silent on the matter. Carpenter, supra note 163, at 1541. They need not justify
their policy to any regulator nor need they respond to the presence of gay Scouts by
discussing with Scouts or the public their organizational stance on Scouts.
171. Carpenter, supra note 163.
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those with the means to create powerful, in-group associations,
transforms Barnette into something very different than merely
protecting the powerless minority against majoritarian sentiment.
The transformation of the eloquence of the Barnette opinion,

solicitous of a minority religious sect, into a capacious doctrine
protective of powerful organizations is only one piece of the doctrinal
trend, with exceptions, of course, to choose organizational control
over individual expression. In cases concerning the right of a public
employer to suppress employee speech, the Court has, recently,
consistently favored both employer control over employee First
Amendment expression and other powerful claimants over weaker
ones.12
As discussed in Part II.A, Hobby Lobby, a for-profit
corporation, using a congressional statute, claimed a right to total
non-expression on issues inconsistent with the faith of the corporate
owners.173 Religious groups further claim a right to silo themselves
from any contact whatsoever with the provision of contraception,
even if not paid for by the religious group.' In a case involving the
objection of the University of Notre Dame to providing notice that it
would not administer or pay for certain contraceptives under the
Affordable Care Act,175 the Supreme Court may be giving credence to
a demand for the doctrinal merger of a right to avoid a distasteful,
expressive contact with statutorily heightened protection for religious
freedom. A merger with a generously framed religious claim thus
172.

LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS

COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 139 (2014) (summarizing four recent cases, which

presented hard choices, and in which the Court "advantaged the powerful over the
comparatively powerless: students, prisoners, public employees, and human rights
activists"). For an important differing view of the logic of cases limiting the speech rights
of public employees, see Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of
ManagerialPrerogative,77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 113 (2008) (explaining how managerial
prerogative over the speech of subordinates enables public institutions to achieve "both
managerial control and managerial accountability").
173. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751. See supra notes 19-49.
174. "Silo" has become a term describing barriers to communication among groups, as
within a business, that would benefit the overall enterprise if the members of the groups
were not separated from exchanging perspectives and information.
The Oxford
Dictionary offers this definition: "system, process, department, etc. that operates in
isolation from others." See OXFORD DICTIONARY for a discussion of the meaning of the
"silo" metaphor in organizations. See also MICHAEL A. DIAMOND AND SETH ALLCORN,
PRIVATE SELVES IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND CHANGE 49-70 (2009) (devoting a chapter to
exploring the meaning and psychological basis of the metaphor as used in the workplace
and concluding with a suggestion that "silos" contribute to "deficiencies and conflicts in
organizational performance").
175. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 562 (7th Cir. 2015).
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deepens the silence permitted under the Dale principle and raises the
volume of silence as a constitutional precept. The claimed right,

apparently one that may require reconsideration in light of Hobby
Lobby, not to be required to express an intention not to administer
contraceptive

services,"'

requires

elaborate

explanation

by

theologians to become expressive association, rather than trivial
paperwork. 77 The silence of the large organization diminished the

autonomous life of employees, which is a right of expressive
development. In its garb of associational freedom, this silence
principle as expressed in Dale, in whatever manifestation within the
silos of law, might be called the cooties doctrine of associational
freedom. 178 For older readers whose grade school days are forgotten,
here is some definitional help. The taunt of cooties served as a grade

school bogeyman that allowed children to mock and prejudice/silence
undesirable individuals (e.g., yucky girls and boys). In its less explicit
form, that of permitting organizations to penalize speech-and having
the effect of silencing-the trend might be called the "shut up"

theory.

176. Id. at 562. On March 9, 2015, the Supreme Court granted Notre Dame's writ of
certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Seventh Circuit, and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Hobby Lobby. See Order List: 575 U.S., Granting Certiorari and
Remanding, 14-392 (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/0309
15zor_3e04.pdf. For a description and analysis of Hobby Lobby, see supra Part II.A.
177. For a skeptical tour by Judge Richard Posner of all the arguments that were used
by Notre Dame in connection with seeking a preliminary injunction to avoid any "taint"
by association with a form disclaiming their intent to provide contraceptive services, see
Univ. of Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 562 (denying a preliminary injunction with respect to
"self-certification" provisions of Affordable Care Act), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015).
178. The "cooties" term is a negative characterization of Carpenter's well-framed
explanation of the way a disfavored identity might contaminate the general understanding
of an organization resistant to including persons with that identity. In Carpenter's words,
"[t]he [Dale dissenters] also ignore an important lesson of the gay civil rights experience,
which teaches that coming out of the closet is a profoundly expressive act affecting not
only the person who comes out but everyone around him.... [The Scouts' exclusion of
openly gay members] is, less charitably, a message of personal revulsion, a denial of the
basic humanity and dignity of gay people." Carpenter, supra note 163, at 1549-50. For
Carpenter, the Scouts have a right to avoid the inclusion of those for whom they harbor a
revulsion that makes association with them intolerably damaging to their organizational
self-image.
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II. The Sociology of Speech and Silence:
Building Civic Capacity
Professor Carpenter argues that, while the image of coerced
speech features the figure of the lone individual exercising a perilous
right to speak, much of the need for protection from state
interference has been located in similarly179 vulnerable organizations.
Professor Carpenter's take on the Court's opinion is elegant and
incisive, yet it lacks the element of sociology' 8° that might refute
abstractions concerning the risk of harm to expressive interests if the
New Jersey statute were enforced. The Dale case, and even the most
sophisticated commentary on it, relies upon a theory of social life that
is uninformed by the empirical observations available through
sociology."'
The Dale framework assumes that a right of
179. See Carpenter, supra note 163, at 1519 ("While the image of the lone citizen
enjoying his First Amendment sovereignty is powerful and accurate as far as it goes, it
misses much of the history of government's efforts to regulate the flow of information and
ideas. Those efforts have frequently concentrated on harassing organizations and have
often only incidentally or instrumentally targeted individuals.").
180. My use of the term "sociology" is relatively loose, in that in jurisprudence, the
term has been used without precise reference to any particular school of sociology as an
academic discipline. The term has been used broadly to refer to schools of judging. G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING

AMERICAN JUDGES 129-30 (2007). Richard Posner notes the use of the term "method of
sociology" by Justice Benjamin Cardozo and suggests that the word choice is unfortunate
because sociology lacks "a distinctive and fruitful methodology." RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 26 (1990). Judge Posner interprets Cardozo's
meaning as: "Laws ought to be guided by consideration of the effects of its decisions, rules,
doctrines, and institutions on social welfare." Id. Judge Posner has suggested that
formalism was only in hibernation for a period and has experienced a return. Id. This
Article suggests that the First Amendment has moved toward formalism, but with
bromides packaged as containers for roughly empirical insights. The problem is that
bromides foreclose the kind of analytic breadth needed for the assessment of the effects of
decisions and other legal products and usages. Bromides find a natural home in the desire
by "a professional caste" for "conceptual tidiness" within judging as "craftsmanship." For
discussion of these terms, see id. at 28.
181. Certain Justices have flirted with the possibility of informing or framing Court
opinions by and within empirical evidence rather than on abstract principles of
Constitutional interpretation.
In the Court's reliance on abstraction about the
requirements of identity formation by a large group with a dominant community footprint
as a spur to richness of discourse, the Court has entirely departed from any lesson pressed
upon the art of judicial decision by Justice Brandeis. Brandeis sought to orient lawyers
and courts to the task of measuring, with data, the empirical effects of a policy. See
generally WHITE, supra note 180. For Justice Brandeis's less idealistic judicial partner,
Justice Holmes, abstractions devised by the Court, such as liberty of contract, interfered
with the proper consideration by the Court; namely, of whether a legislative act "was
grounded on some rational basis or tied to the achievement of some important public
purpose." Id. at 142. For Brandeis, a pre-existing ideological commitment to a set of
beliefs, in Roscoe Pound's words, is developed "in the teeth of actual facts." Id. at 140
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organizational silence, as a general rule for any organization claiming
an expressive commitment,1" enhances the robustness of social
expression by enabling groups to develop and advance a cohesive
view of individual issues or of the correct social meanings and
understandings among the group, many unspoken and fragile.183 This
view assumes that silence is a socially invariant, and reliably valuable,
phenomenon with positive effects on discursive exchange within and
between groups. Under associational First Amendment privacy,
many groups thereby attain the standing of the nuclear family: a site
for fostering values in an intensely protected cocoon of expressive
control. 18' Dale and the jurisprudence of silence do not recognize that
silence may not be an unmitigated good in social life. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has not undertaken any inquiry at all into the social
manifestations and effects of silence. Yet a variety of sociological and
literary treatments could provide insight into the texture of silence in
the world.'
(citing Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 462 (1909)). In the case of
the First Amendment, the claim that the Court should not consider the purpose of the
anti-discrimination ordinance as a possible contribution to First Amendment values is
manifestly weak, given that the Court's analysis arises from a judicial construct built
around ideas about the purpose and effect of the First Amendment. The New Jersey
consensus, reflected in the passage of the anti-discrimination ordinance and its application
by the New Jersey Supreme Court to the Scouts, indicates that New Jersey viewed it as a
net positive for citizenship in New Jersey. But see Carpenter, supra note 163, at 1535
(arguing that any First Amendment purpose for the anti-discrimination law is an attempt
by the government to impose its values on citizens). As noted, Justice Cardozo advocated
a form of reasoning that consulted the effects of legal mandates and institutions. POSNER,
CARDOZO, supra note 180, at 26.
182. Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
183. Carpenter, supra note 163, at 1543 ("Unlike code drafters, people often speak in
order to obfuscate, not to illuminate; in order to compromise a web of conflicting interests,
not to clear them out. Understanding the speech of a group trying to transmit moral
values without unnecessarily offending or hurting people is not like understanding a tax
code.").
184. The idea of the family as an incubator of goods in the form of stable identities has
become a target of critical challenge. See TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT:
MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE (2010) (generally
describing the dangers attendant on family forms and suggesting means by which the
liberal state may protect the interests of vulnerable members of intimate associations for
care); CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) (arguing that contract models
in liberal societies consistently permit domination of women by males, including in
marriage).
185. Erving Goffman is the source of the most theoretically interesting studies of
modes of interaction. His method was an acute observation of human interactions. See,
e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959)
[hereinafter GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF]; ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) [hereinafter GOFFMAN,
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A. Distinguishing the Potential Effects of Expressive Silence

Expressive silence has the potential to enhance or inhibit an
individual's social development depending on whether her silence is
self-elected or imposed by outsiders, respectively.' 86 Further, when an
individual-and, for a psychology of speech, not a group using silence
as a sword against association-chooses expressive silence, the
expression has the tendency to produce more speech without the
expense of suppressing other speakers.187 For example, the first great
American writer vividly embodies the oxymoronic nature of silence
as expressive empowerment for an individual. As a 16-year-old
learning to manipulate a writer's persona, Benjamin Franklin used
the pseudonym, Silence Dogood, to establish a sly presence as a

clever commentator on public affairs and culture in Boston. 88 He
ironically manipulated a female character with the chaste name of
Silence to speak with the boldness, rendered saucy by the assumed

mantle of Silence, of a young male in colonial society. 189

The

STIGMA]; ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL
MANAGEMENT OF GATHERINGS (1963) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC
PLACES]; ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE

BEHAVIOR (1967). Topics in sociological treatments have included the forms silence
takes and the forms of unspoken coordination that can sustain a conspiracy of silence. See
Eviatar Zerubavel, The Social Sound of Silence: Toward a Sociology of Denial, in
SHADOWS OF WAR: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SILENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 32

(Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, Ruth Ginio, & Jay Winter eds., 2014) (arguing that a sociology of denial
addresses the "interpersonal dynamics used to prevent information from entering the
public discourse" of a group); see also EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE ELEPHANT IN THE
ROOM: SILENCE AND DENIAL IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2006).
186. Studies of social power demonstrate that dominant groups are able to maintain a
subject status and impose on others the status of undifferentiated object. The capacity for
speech and personal control over identity is located in those who have a subject status, and
is limited in those who occupy the status of object, or socially imposed irrelevance, which
resembles imposed silence. "Those who dominate, subjects, even conceive of themselves
as outside of any particular category, because they are members of the category that has
discursive power to define, locate, and order others." Judith A. Howard, A Sociological
Framework of Cognition, in SELF AND SOCIETY 102 (Ann Branaman ed., 2001); see also
ROBIN PATRIC CLAIR, ORGANIZING SILENCE: A WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES XIII (1998)

(explaining that one meaning of the title is the methods by which "marginalized people are
silenced").
187.

See

CHERYL

GLENN,

UNSPOKEN:

A

RHETORIC

OF

SILENCE

4

(2004)

(maintaining that "silence reveals speech").
188.

H. W. BRANDS, THE FIRST AMERICAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BENJAMIN

FRANKLIN 27-29 (2000).

189. Id. at 26-27 (referring to "Mrs. DoGood" and "she"). Brands suggests that
nineteenth century readers would not have recognized that "this ironically knowing voice
belonged to a sixteen-year-old boy."

Id. at 27.

Presumably, Brands means that the

assumption was that an older commentator had written the contribution, as it was the
practice at his brother's paper to present an appearance of multiple contributors. Id. at 26.
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significance of Silence as his nom de plume deepens with the reasons

Franklin used a pen name and the clever jibe his chosen name
contained. First, Franklin desired anonymity because he feared the
ridicule of his printer brother's adult literary circles in Philadelphia if

he were known to be the author.' 9 Second, the chaste female name
contained a command aimed at Cotton Mather, the Boston eminence.
Cotton had written Essays to Do Good, and hence Franklin called for

his readers to silence Cotton in the interests of "a dynamic, open
society." 19'

Thus, Franklin created a double-edged meaning of

Silence-that of a virtuous female carrying the self-effacing name of
Silence, and that of a male adult using Silence personified to diminish

the entitled but droning voice of Cotton Mather, the representative of
Massachusetts conventional speech. 92 Young Ben found a voice that
would mature into that of a leading political and intellectual figure. 93

In the social reality of the time, Silence could not speak, unless she
was understood to be a mask for a male speaker.1 94 Silence could only
be asserted by one who would one day have the leave to speak-the

young Ben Franklin, who deployed a persona as Silence to develop
the skills in expression to which his real persona was eligible by virtue
of talent 95 and to achieve multiple ironies in manipulating the social
rules for participation in public talk.' 96 His success in speaking as

190.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 1

(Ralph Louis Ketcham ed., 2003).
191. Id. at 1. Another author portrays Franklin's use of the pen name differently,
describing it as "paying homage both to the book [Bonifacius: Essays to Do Good] and to
a famous sermon by Mather, 'Silentiarius: The Silent Sufferer."' WALTER ISAACSON,
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 26 (2004).
192. BRANDS, supra note 188, at 25-27 (discussing the denunciation by Cotton
Mather's family, and likely by Cotton Mather himself, of James Franklin's paper in
reaction to its criticisms of Mather).
193. ISAACSON, supra note 191, at 326 (describing Franklin's influence in Paris as a
diplomat earned by his fame as a literary figure and a scientist).
194. For women in the eighteenth century, heavy convention called for them to avoid
"the public gaze," which situated them outside the domestic sphere. "[T]o write, or at
least publish, was for the eighteenth century woman a transgressive act." VIVIEN JONES,
WOMEN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: CONSTRUCTIONS OF FEMININITY 140 (1990).

The norm against speaking on a public stage was even stronger limitation for women who
ELIZABETH URBAN
desired to speak on major issues and gain an audience.
ALEXANDER, NOTORIOUS WOMAN: THE CELEBRATED CASE OF MYRA CLARK GAINES

159 (2004) (explaining the "formidable barriers for women who sought a public
platform").
195. Id. at 29 (describing the Silence Dogood letters as revealing "emerging genius").
196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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Silence accorded Ben a sense of intellectual superiority97 that
launched his life as the leading intellect of his American time and set
him on his course as a participant in public affairs.9 For Benjamin
Franklin, Silence was his own private mentor for public speech. But
Silence was not silence-speaking with a surprising literary force as
Silence, Franklin was not powerless, nor was young Franklin as
Silence or as Benjamin as yet an expression of power.
The sociology and literature of silence reveals a different
landscape for those on whom silence is imposed rather than elected
or manipulated. Almost everyone knows the custom of signaling ingroup rules on who may speak and what may be said. Extending the
custom of social silence in small gatherings to large socially powerful
groups as a legal protection against applicable laws for access to civic
space becomes a social fact that limits resources for expression and
defines the boundaries of possible speech. Individual Scouts are not
situated as are writers and speakers; they manifestly lack the
resources by which to exploit Dale as a net plus for either identity or
expression. They have little social power to create counter spaces,
comparable in reach and carrying the unremarked diversity of young
men, in which a variation in identity may be uncontroversial. For
those enveloped in the concrete silence celebrated as a First
Amendment value but over which they lack social influence, silence
may well have a practical association with lack of social power and
the attendant impoverishment of expressive capital.' It may further
block the locally available paths for flourishing and developing the
personal capital that comes from full access to civic space.
For those with a disfavored identity, silence is more likely to be
about circumspection, tact, caution, and fear& While each of these

expressive strategies has a place in the palette of expression, their
distribution across the spectrum of potential speakers is not even and
can be affected either negatively or positively by the signals about the
allocation to speakers of the necessity to observe them, as well as
understandings about whether they are entitled to conceal those facts
they are not permitted to say.20' The silence of the Scouting

197.

BRANDS, supra note 188, at 33.

198. ISAACSON, supra note 191, at 326 (noting his eminence).
199. MORTENSEN, supranote 86, at 273-93.
200. MAE KUYKENDALL, PRESSING THE MUTE BUTTON: RACE SILENCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 29 (unpublished manuscript).
201. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 185, at 64. The military policy that required

members of the military to conceal their sexual identity, and which treated any speech
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organization is a powerful social tool in the hands of those managing
the conventions of group dynamics. Group dynamics, in which
powerless carriers of stigma must often exist, draw upon complex
phenomena that sociologists have mapped under such categories as
the obligation to "fit in" 2°2 and with attention to the subtleties of
unstated rules about face-to-face interactions. 3 For gay Scouts, the
rule was, and still is to a significant degree,' presented as a norm of
silence about a controversial identity. Over time, the social power to
enforce the rule has many practical meanings for nuances in the
norms of social interaction, as well as ejection from civic group space.
From the gay Scouts' perspective, there is no manageable choice to
remain in the group and respect silence, because that choice is at odds
with the social rules on personal disclosure in intimate groups. 25
The bind regarding disclosure and secrecy is well known to gay
people. Though demanded from the group of gay Scouts, reticence 2°6
is also a betrayal of the group interaction norms that, when
discovered, is at least as serious as breaching silence.2" The classic
about their identity as conduct, and same-sex conduct, even if revealed by an informer, as
speech, did not give service members clear permission to have a private life. Concealment
was dangerous, and was not a guarantee of safety from group censure and expulsion.
"Individuals were separated from military service after confiding in family members,
nonmilitary friends, chaplains, doctors, and therapists." Developments in the Law: Sexual
Orientation & Gender Identity ChapterFive: Progress Where You Might Least Expect It:
The Military's Repeal of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell," 127 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1796 (2014).
The law was repealed by the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010," Pub. L. No.
111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010).
202. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES, supra note 185, at 11.
203. Id.
204. Membership Standards Resolution, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, http://www.scout
ing.org/MembershipStandards/Resolution/Resolution.aspx ("While the BSA does not
proactively inquire about sexual orientation of employees, volunteers, or members, we do
not grant membership to individuals who are open or avowed homosexuals or who engage
in behavior that would become a distraction to the mission of the BSA.").
205. In small groups, there is an expectation that members have been sincere and
open with another about who they are. Identities to be stigmatized are also suspected of
surreptitiously infiltrating groups of "normals." See GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 185.
The dilemma of such a stigmatized identity is typified in the movie Philadelphia. In
Philadelphia, the attorney defending the dismissal of a gay man challenges the former
employee's character and credibility, asserting "[i]sn't it true you've spent your life
pretending to be something you're not.., so much so that the art of concealment and
dishonesty... has become second nature." PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1991).
206. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 185.
207. Id. at 177. Reticence has historically taken the form of an implicit agreement
among gay people to respect a "right against outing." LARRY GROSS, CONTEST CLOSETS
169 (1993) (quoting RICHARD MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER
CONTROVERSIES 27 (1992)). Yet the power of outing has, until recently, relied on an
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dilemma of the closet is imposed on young Scouts-if you disclose
yourself, you are flaunting and disrupting a silence. If you conceal
yourself, you are dishonest."
The trap for gay people at various
times and places is shown poignantly by the case in which a school
teacher was fired for being "out" through political activism." The
trial court held that the firing was justified."' The appellate court
reversed, holding that firing him for his open expression of his
sexuality was a First Amendment violation. " The teacher received
no relief, however, because at the time of hiring he had failed to
disclose his orientation.212 He could be fired for a misleading job
application.1 3
Interestingly, though Dale had a right to be open about his
sexual orientation, the ability of the Scouts to punish him for his
speech, against applicable New Jersey law, has the perverse effect of
shifting the right of censorship to a private entity with a dominant
role in Dale's home community. Notably, the Scouts learned of
Dale's sexual orientation in a publication at Rutgers University away
from his home troop in Monmouth County, New Jersey.1 4 Thus,
though Dale had no need to conceal himself in his life in a university,
and was free of government punishment, the Scouts were able to
exact a damaging penalty for his relatively quiet exit from the closet.
The effect surely chills the speech of others in his circumstances.
Moreover, an organizational right of banishment for speech revealing
a fact about oneself is a tax on the ability of a stigmatized group to
take advantage of available developmental opportunities, such as
open participation in other civic spaces where free speech is
protected. What the Court gave with one hand in free speech
doctrine, it took away with the other hand when it granted the
underlying homophobia that gave "a special surge of rhetorical force" to "selective
utterance of open secrets whose tacitness structures hierarchical enforcement." Id.
(quoting EVE SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 245 (1990)). For Dale,
the rhetorical force of speech he made did not result from his aiming it at the Scouting
community but was provided by the homophobia of the Scouting executives who became
aware of his modest gay leadership role noted in a small announcement. In effect, the
Scouts created the speech effect from which they then demanded constitutional
protection.
208. Id.
209. WILLIAM B. TURNER, A GENEALOGY OF QUEER THEORY 136 (2000).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
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organizational claim on silence against well-considered state laws
designed to build civic capacity.
The message to young Scouts, who are learning the customary
norms of groups that silence a subject and the legal hammer behind
the demand, is that the mere existence of a gay person is a form of
disruptive speech215 requiring deep silencing achieved by complete
withdrawal from a formative space in American youth society. The
defunct regulations that required silence by gay members of the
military made formal the closet's demand for silence by situating gay
soldiers as inherently deceptive if they engaged in any act expressing
of their identity, even in private.216
In sociological terms, the processes involved in the social
management of interactions and thus of silence involve a complex
array of situational effects that sociologists who earlier conducted
' classified
"microstudies of the public order"217
under evocative terms

such as "pacification,,

21

8

"enactment of engrossment, ' ' 219 "routing

signals," 220

and "conversational preserve., 22' Each of these phrases has
been deployed to describe territorial claims over who could enter into
a group interaction, or in Erving Goffman's terms for an interaction
among individuals, a "with., 222 While Goffman focused on the usages
that arise spontaneously in conditions of physical presence, the
insights provided by such close study of how people, and groups,
channel expression are the necessary factual basis for constructing
law that is better than a free-form, quasi-empirical construct. The
theoretical benefits of the silence principle as an abstract protection
for organizations, and as a source of demonstrable rewards it confers

215. Mark Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy Scout Case Was Rightly (But
Wrongly) Decided, 35 CONN. L. REV. 129, 161-62 (2002) (arguing that knowledge that
there are gay Scouts will create adverse speech in the form of gossip and mockery of the
Scouts, like that endured by the YMCA).
216. See supra note 201 and accompanying text for a characterization of the lack of
safety among any other persons for gay military personnel during "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell."
217.

See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF

THE PUBLIC ORDER (1972).
218. Id. at 5.
219. Id. at 4-5.
220. Id. at 14.
221. Id. at 40 (explaining as part of a conversation preserve "the right of a set of
individuals once engaged in talk to have their circle protected from entrance and
overhearing by others").
222. Id.
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on meta-discourse,223 should be examined in light of the broad goals of
the First Amendment as a protection for expressive capacity, tested
against the social reality of the realm of silence. Indeed, in his book
that focuses more on the tradeoff between the benefits of "enclaves"
versus "contact," than on legal doctrine, Cass Sunstein is explicit
about the risks that arise from too many enclaves that cut off contact
and thus create and maintain ignorance.2 4' The Court's jurisprudence
contains no indication of any awareness of the tradeoff, only seeing
the choice as between the First Amendment, as theorized by the
Court over time, and a counter value of anti-discrimination. In fact,
the tradeoff is internal to the First Amendment. 2 '
The key claim that rationalizes Dale is the right of expressive
associations to avoid contact by membership with identities that are
seen as contaminating their message, vetoing their preference for
silence, or creating a fear of infection by a stigma through public
226
mockery aimed at the group of what Goffman calls "normals.
Permitting "expressive" organizations such a license is, without
empirical evidence, said to foster greater debate by and about the
stigmatized group, or about political ground rules generally. 227 But
the claim is limited to purportedly enriching debate over ideas. By
contrast, the claim does not assert anything about the sociology of
knowledge as a subject concerned with the "everyday" lives of
people.
Theoretical thought, "ideas," Weltanschauungen, are
not that important in society.... Only a very limited
group of people in any society engages in theorizing, in
223. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 11.
224. Id. at 158.
225. Compare id. at 156 (noting that certain state interventions run afoul of the First
Amendment and citing the unconstitutionality of a right-of-reply law to be included in
newspapers, as held in Miami HeraldPubl'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
226. Goffman defines "normal"with reference to his relational definition of "stigma."
A stigma, in Goffman's glossary, "an attribute that is deeply discrediting [in] . . . a
language of relationships, not attributes. An attribute that stigmatizes one type of
possessor can confirm the usualness of another, and therefore is neither creditable nor
discreditable as a thing in itself." In a given situation, a stigma is: "an undesired difference
from what we had expected." Goffman thus defines "normals" as "those who do not
depart negatively from the particular expectations at issue." GoFFMAN, STIGMA, supra,
note 185, at 2-5.
227. Carpenter, supra note 163, at 1518 ("the freedom of expressive association
contributes to equality by allowing people in groups to find strength and confidence in
numbers, bolstering their civic and political power and contributing to the flow of ideas so
needed for democratic government").
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the business of "ideas," and the construction of
Weltanschauungen.
But everyone in society
participates in its "knowledge" in one way or another.
Put differently, only a few are concerned with the
theoretical interpretation of the world, but everybody
lives in a world of some sort. Not only is the focus on
theoretical thought unduly restrictive for the sociology
of knowledge, it is also unsatisfactory because even
this part of socially available "knowledge" cannot be
fully understood if it is not placed in the framework of
a more general analysis of "knowledge." . . . It is
precisely this "knowledge" that constitutes the fabric
of meanings without which no society could exist.2"
The focus by the Court and by commentators on a right of
organizational exclusion as a means to enhance debate about ideas is,
in many respects, self-referential. The Court's coin of the realm is
debate as a form of intellectual discourse. It is easy enough to project
the world of debating teams and legal advocates into the realm of
everyday knowledge-to ignore the sociology of knowledge. 29
The words of Stanley Cavell are worth revisiting:
It is not a voice that will be heard by villains. This
means that to discover our community a few will have
to be punched out, made speechless in their effort to
usurp or devalue the speech of others... It is a fantasy
of a reasonably well ordered participatory democracy.
It has its dangers; democracy has; speech has."'
Cavell suggests that contributions to democratic speech can be
measured "somewhere between two cents and the largest fortune in
the world. 231 In the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, two
cents is in competition with the largest fortune in the world. And
losing.

228. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 15 (1967).

229. Id. ("To exaggerate the importance of theoretical thought in society and history
is a natural failing of theorizers.").
230. See CAVELL, supra note 75, at 207.
231. Id. at 207.
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B. Imposed Silence and Internalized Stigma
Erving Goffman is, as noted, the key writer on the subtleties of

"presentation of self in everyday life. 232 Goffman's writings on the
implications of "dramaturgical circumspection, ' ' 21' as well as general

techniques of presentation of self, sharpen the analysis of the
expressive meanings of silence as they may differ depending on
setting and the "performer. ' ,234 In addition, Goffman's appreciation of
the subtle performance issues presented by social context and social

conventions help sort out the effects on performance choices-either
multiplying or reducing "dramaturgical" 3 choices and hence
expressive richness-that are created by the Supreme Court's First
Amendment rulings.
Depending on the sophistication of the performer.' 3' a
performance may contain conscious responses to the dramaturgical
cues provided by the Supreme Court's writings that affect the implicit
premises of her performance; her performance may also be infused
with the subconscious internalization of new staging prompts that
demand dramaturgical circumspection and impose rather than permit
forms of "tact" in giving and watching performances.3

Discussed

below are the implications of the Supreme Court's dramaturgical
cues21 in opinions such as Dale, and in its continuing jurisprudence of
legally protected rights to establish a zone between an organization
claiming a protected right of expressive association and either a

stigmatized identity (excluded persons) or a stigmatized function
232.

GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 185.

233. Id. See Peter Kivisto & Dan Pittman, Goffman's DramaturgicalSociology (2007),
available at http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/16569 Chapter_10.pdf ("For Goffman, the
subject matter of dramaturgical sociology is the creation, maintenance, and destruction of
understandings of reality by people working individually and collectively to present a
shared and unified image of that reality.").
234. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 185, at 15. Goffman defines
"performance" in social settings as "all the activity of a given participant on a given
occasion which serves to influence in any way any other the other participants." Id.
Hence, a performer is someone engaged as a participant on a given occasion. The same
person does performances of different kinds in different settings. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 32 (suggesting variations in time and skill for "performing" to create an
impression).
237. Id. at 9 (generally explaining how an individual in a performance before a group
sends and receives "definitions of the situation" that create a"veneer of consensus").
Though Goffman bases these observations on a formal description of individual instances
of interaction, he also explains that "these situational terms can easily be related to
conventional structural ones." Id. at 16.
238. See Kivisto & Pittman, supra note 233.
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arising from a neutral programmatic requirement. 9 Unanticipated
consequences for associational openness in genuinely public spaces
for free and vigorous interaction may emerge from the lack of a
sociological grasp of how stigmas form and may shift over time, and
2 °
of the effects on expressive richness of First Amendment values
approving exclusions and enforced buffer zones.24'
The cues provided by the Supreme Court are likely to have an
effect on the assumptions about strategies for "interactions between
stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals., 24 2 The format of the
Supreme Court's reasoning about the need to guard expressive
resources by exclusion of those inimical to one's associational
expressiveness undercuts the sociological perspective 243 on creating
"interactional-level strategies" and "societal-level strategies" to
reduce the awkward moments in interactions between stigmatized
and non-stigmatized individuals.2" Indeed, the implicit methodology
of the Court-concern with the potential to degrade an expressive
identity through enforced contact with an undesirable or rejected
identity-is at odds with the underlying methodology of social
psychology, which assumes that "stigmas" derive from stereotype and
call for forms of intervention.245
The right of persons to be afforded public accommodations,
rather than being excluded from a general exposure to the variety of
settings, cultures, and forms of knowledge, is a means of transmitting
cultural knowledge and decreasing the kind of isolation that societies
predicated on a practice of creating out-castes2 generate. Out-castes
239. Hobby Lobby, 134 . Ct. 2751.
240. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1197 (4th ed. 2013) (reviewing
theories of the various values underpinning the First Amendment).
241. By buffer zones, I intend to convey the function of the doctrine of expressive
associational freedom to indicate the creation of a zone of separation from disapproved
identities as one product of the doctrine. That is, separation from the disdained identity
creates a buffer that also protects the group claiming the right from input that might be
provided by the speech or communicative identity of the rejected type.
242. Michelle R. Hebl, Jennifer Tickle, & Todd F. Heatherton, Awkward Moments in
Interactions Between Nonstigmatized and Stigmatized Individuals, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA 273 (Todd F. Heatherton, Robert E. Kleck, Michelle R. Hebl,
& Jay G. Hull eds., 2003).
243. Id. at 276 (presenting firsthand accounts and empirical research to investigate
Goffman's model of interactions between stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals).
244. Id. at 292-99.
245. Id. at 298 (describing in favorable terms progress in dispelling the stigma
surrounding homosexuality).
246. The term "out-caste" is devised here to combine the sense of outcast as a pariah
or outsider, and the idea of caste as a group that is socially distinct from other groups. An
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are the product of a society built on customs that target some groups,
based on a characteristic that gives that group some common,
ascribed identity. 247 In a society with doctrines enforcing the right of
exclusion generously, targeted groups are less likely to thrive on the
basis of general acculturation achieved through robust engagement
with the discursive capital of the whole society.248 For example, the
virtually total exclusion of black persons from white societyincluding institutions of learning, literary and scholarly circles, and
venues for nineteenth century lectures and other events designed to
improve general literacy-prevented the flourishing of the black
population as participants in the benefits of free expression. 249 The
exclusion was particularly frustrating for black intellectuals, who were
cordoned from experience with forms of expression that they
prized.2 10 Human contact is a basic building block of personality
formation, self-presentation, and progression into a social world as
constituted by the whole range of public and quasi-private
associations."' At its most extreme, those deprived of human contact
outcast may be an individual ejected from society because of a history or behavior that
isolates him. Such a condition may well be properly deemed a stigma, but the personal
flavor of specific individual reasons for rejection has an informal tone, whereas a caste is a
formal designation within certain societies. Hence, out-caste conveys a deepened meaning
that designates a wholesale assignment of stigma to individuals who may not conceal their
stigma.
247. See Hebl, Tickle, & Heatherton, supra note 242, at 273.
248. In the context of racial segregation, Richard Posner captures the effect on those
excluded from cultivated circles by educational segregation: "Apart from the
psychological damage segregation may have caused blacks, it denied them the
opportunities for valuable associations with whites-associations actually more valuable
for blacks than for whites." POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 155, at 303. For a
minority, the opportunity for wider contacts with a majority provides an advantageous
exposure to a large percentage of the total cultural capital available; exclusion imposes
significant damage on the process of acculturation for a small subset of a society.
249. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 27 (2003) (discussing the exclusion from
"participation in the American bourgeois public sphere" and from progressive "subaltern
counterpublics"). Note that such exclusions from a "public sphere" were the sum of
associational exclusions that hampered the access of black intellectuals to knowledge, as
well as their contribution to either "everyday knowledge" or "ideas."
250. Even those ex-slaves who joined the abolitionist movement to serve as witnesses
to audiences receptive to hearing about the facts of slavery found themselves excluded
from genuine association with the white sponsors of their appearances. WILLIAM M.
BANKS, BLACK INTELLECTUALS: RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 24
(1996). See also id. at 25 (noting the dependence of black intellectuals on influential
whites, without whose approval they "found themselves on the margins of cultural and
political discourse").
251. Judith Howard provides a sociological elaboration of a social context for building
identity. She argues that North American social psychology is prone to "extreme
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in infancy suffer losses of capacity for expression that can never be
recovered.2 By extension, the narrowing of associational outlets
imposes costs on human development of a gradually more severe

form, as the limitations increase and limit the accumulation of
valuable contacts and experiences. 2" Hence, anti-discrimination law

supports expressive capacity and consequent freedom for a citizenry
capable of contributing to knowledge. 4
When large groups such as the Boy Scouts assert organizational

costs associated with compliance with a particular anti-discrimination
law, the benefits of exemption are hypothetical but the costs land on
the included, the excluders, and the excluded.

The group may

persuade the Court of a speculative harm to an organizational
message. By contrast, noncompliance with an antidiscrimination law
inflicts concrete social harm on those excluded, as well on those
passing255 within the organization, and inhibits the underlying basis of
the First Amendment-production of informed citizens with a
capacity for engagement and contribution to speech. Given the aid
that an anti-discrimination law provides to the disempowered, to civic
engagement, and to the production of knowledge, the Court should

be cautious in freezing the First Amendment into a framework
valorizing the good of silence over the challenge of expressive

interactions.
It is worthwhile to note here that the eminent constitutional
scholar Laurence Tribe attempted to avoid discussing the values of
individualism," an intellectual stance that causes the field to spend too little effort to the
study of the ways in which "intergroup relations are central to cognitive processes."
Howard, supra note 186, at 116. Interestingly, the American legal system also focuses on
the individual and, in analyzing a group's claim of legal rights, attributes to it the needs of
an individual. In addition, the First Amendment theory constructed by the Supreme
Court relies on theories about individual cognition without investigating the "everyday
knowledge" of its society.
252. The example of the damage done to orphans held in Romanian institutions and
deprived of human contact is an extreme example of the effects of deprivation of human
interaction. Jon Hamilton, Orphans' Lonely Beginnings Reveal How Parents Shape a
Child's Brain, NPR (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.npr.orgblogs/health/2014/02/20/280237
833/orphans-lonely-beginnings-reveal-how-parents-shape-a-childs-brain.
253. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
254. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 11. See also ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY:
INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 345-47 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (explaining
the importance of replacing stereotypes about others with "real knowledge" resulting
from "observation and experiment and free discussion among men").
255. Passing refers to a practice of concealing one's identity for the purpose of being
accepted within a group disdainful of one's underlying characteristic. GOFFMAN, STIGMA,
supranote 185, at 73-91.
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silence, either by the Boy Scouts or by the Scouts excluded from
participation, by arguing that Dale embodied the anticommandeering principle that the Rehnquist Supreme Court had
been developing.256 Specifically, in a passage that substituted as a
doctrinal label "the right not to be commandeered" for the right to
enforce an organizational silence, Tribe argued:
The right that all of these cases affirm is better
understood as a right not to be used or commandeered
to do the state's ideological bidding by having to
mouth, convey, embody, or sponsor a message,
especially the state's message, with one's voice or body
or resources, on one's personal possessions, through
the composition of the associations one joins or forms,
or in their selection of teachers, exemplars, and
leaders.
The right not to be appropriated or
conscripted as a means to the state's speech-related
ends ought to be a particularly potent right: Whatever
legitimate goals the state seeks to achieve when it
restricts speech are goals the state is often hardpressed to achieve by any other means. In contrast,
any legitimate goals the state seeks to achieve by using
individuals or associations to convey or endorse its
views are likely to be achievable by the state speaking
with its own voice, at the expense of all taxpayers
rather than just those few who are singled out to bear
the burden of serving as the state's megaphone.257
Here, Tribe sought to say that the Scout organization was not
necessarily claiming a right of silence about homosexuality. Rather,
the claim was about the right of a group not to be used by the state to
convey an ideological message that the state itself could effectively
advocate.5 " Yet all the language Tribe uses invokes speech acts. One
'
should not have to "mouth, convey, embody, or sponsor a message"259
under state compulsion.
But the substitution of the term
"commandeer" for the idea of forced speech through association,
256. Laurence Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood,28
PEPP. L. REV. 641,645 (2001).
257. Id. at 645.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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which either conveys the state's message or forces the organization to
speak to rebut the impression that it agrees with the embodied
message, does not appear to do any analytic work. It is a synonym
more than it is a distinction. Moreover, the flaw in Tribe's analysis is
once again that the idea of how speech might be invigorated, and
serve just as well or better if made directly by the state, is an
abstraction unrelated to the sociology of civic capacity.
Tribe appears to agree with the analysis in this Article that the
state is attempting to enhance some aspect of expression.26 Tribe
calls it requiring an organization to "convey or express [the state's]
views."' '

It is not entirely clear, though, that the state is pressing a

view so much as breaking down barriers to civic engagement, which
strengthens First Amendment values not by conveying a specific
message but by preventing the isolation of a segment of the
population from engagement with the primary civic outlet available
for acculturation. Tribe's argument seems to be saying that the state
would be forcing the Scouts to carry a specific message about
homosexuality, which is different than breaking their silence. But,
presumably, if any organization is ordered not to discriminate, as
against women, or against Catholics, the message is one of nondiscrimination, not one containing any particular view of women or
Catholics. Anita Bernstein has captured the importance of civil rights
law for expressive freedom. "Legislatures that enact civil rights
legislation have put the imprimatur of democratic deliberation on a
progressive stance." 262
Notably, no such commandeering argument could become a
basis for racial discrimination in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. Although speakers retain the right to express views
about race that disfavor racial minorities, they cannot effectuate that
right against applicable anti-discrimination law by laying claim to a
First Amendment right not to embody a message of racial harmony
and acceptance, or to follow a religious belief in racial separateness
uncontaminated by racial minority membership.263 General doctrine
on race makes that plain; the Court rejects racial classifications by the

260.
261.
262.
Broken
263.

Id.
Id.
See Bernstein, supra note 114. See also Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations =
Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. REV. 895, 933-34 (2010).
See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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state as toxic, with the narrowest exceptions.2" Thus, the Court would
not endorse a classification by inserting race into its First Amendment
doctrine as a basis for claiming exemption from anti-discrimination
laws. There is no need to speculate whether the Court would agree
with a First Amendment claim that whites-only membership carries a
message about race and is protected. In 1983, the Court rejected the
argument by Bob Jones University that its rule against interracial
dating was an exercise of religious liberty, and that to deprive it of its
tax-exempt status because of its rule against an internal association it
regarded as sinful violated its First Amendment rights."'
Nor can racially exclusionary groups succeed by changing their
locution to argue that the state is commandeering them to convey its
message when it applies anti-discrimination ordinances to preclude
exclusion of selected groups from membership on the basis of race.
The change in phrasing has no force. Further, protecting black
citizens from general exclusion by community organizations may not
be exclusively about conveying a message about race, but rather
about ending the isolation that impaired a racial minority's full
participation in the marketplace of ideas266 by enabling them to join a
full range of community groups."' Thus, arguing how best to allow
the Scouts' preferred message to be intact from interference by state
conscription to broadcast its own message misses the import of antidiscrimination law as a First Amendment support that does not carry
a message, but rather enhances civic capacity by softening community
insularity. "Conscription" analysis is formal and un-sociological.
Further, it is contrary to a favored First Amendment bromide: More
speech is always better. 268 Again, Justice Brandeis tells us: "If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. 2 69 As discussed above,
community insularity is a substantial force in American life.
Maintaining such insularity needs no help from First Amendment
264. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2014); see also Johnson v. California, 545
U.S. 162 (2005).
265. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 574.
266. For a racial minority generally excluded from majority community groups, the
loss of access to the general culture and the ideas within the culture that might learned
through associations is substantial and across the board. See supra notes 246-54 and
accompanying text.
267.

See KUYKENDALL, supra note 200, at 29.

268.
269.

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.
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abstractions that posit a need for protecting and further entrenching

such features of everyday life.
At the level of meta-First Amendment discourse, the Court's

teaching about civic engagement legitimizes the expression of what
would be classified in sociological writing, with a scientific patina, as

stereotype in need of intervention. 7 ° An element of the First
Amendment claim contains the seeds of the substantive due process
doctrine protecting parental rights that the Supreme Court once
anchored to the right to practice a trade. 27 As such, the right of the

Boy Scouts organization to exclude an openly gay person confers on
the corporate speaker the borrowed claims of parental substantive
due process rights.

2

As an example, one writer argued that one

unarticulated basis for the Court's holding is the right, grounded in
substantive due process, of parents to protect their children from
intimate situations that might encourage sexual contact at an early
age with others their age.273 While couched in a logical format-the
mixing of teenage boys, a subset of whom are openly gay, is
analogous to mixed-sex settings and thus likely to lead to intra-teen
sexual activity274-the argument nonetheless focuses on the salient

features of the gay stigma by emphasizing a discomfort with a detail
of the stigma and attributing to gay boys a propensity to seduce
straight boys. And the logic further bestows on the large Scouting
organization, built through wide public support and accommodations

by government, the mantle of parental control and family privacy.

270. The "contact hypothesis," generally attributed to Gordon Allport, proposes that
contact with a group that others stereotype will moderate the prejudice carried by the
stereotype. Since Allport originated the hypothesis, and attached conditions to it that
suggested only long-term personal contact in a positive environment reduced prejudice,
Thomas Pettigrew has made findings that suggest the conditions are not necessary and
that contact has net positive effects under varying conditions. See GORDON ALLPORT,
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). For the later analysis, see Thomas Pettigrew,
Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 49, 65-85 (1998).
271. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
272. Sadly, the Supreme Court validates the parental right to control his or her child's
formation of core values, which may include forcing upon one's child invalid, prejudiced
views. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390; Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
273. Hager, supra note 215, at 161-62. Hager is not entirely clear about whether the
Scouts directly hold parental rights, in loco parentis, or that the right of parents to control
the upbringing of their children would be frustrated if non-discrimination could be applied
to deprive them of single-sex associations for their children's education and social
development. Id.
274. Id.
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Thus, the Supreme Court's methodology does more than affirm
support for freedom of expression as having an associative
component generally. It specifically sets up a framework for the
intensification and justification of stigma about a group and for the
maintenance of restrictive social mechanisms, conceived in a loose
association with Lochner precedent about parental control. The
protection-from-stigma framework blunts the working of the "contact
hypothesis," an empirically tested sociological claim that certain
forms of contact reduce the awkwardness of contact between
stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals. 75 The Court's format of
reasoning, drawn from abstractions about exclusion to develop group
cohesion ,276 tends to favor the status quo in everyday life by impeding
interactions that instigate change. While change is certain to occur
over time, the overall health of free expression might best be
measured by the extent of opportunities for silences to be negotiable,
rather than endorsed by constitutionally normative reasoning. The
power of the First Amendment is in the challenge it poses to custom,
The instinct, common even in groups
instinct, and social habit.7
of knowledge, is to control forums
the
production
organized around
to the exclusion of counter speech,7 unpleasant speech, 79 or even
275. See Hebl, Tickle, & Heatherton, supra note 242, at 298; see also Pettigrew, supra
note 144.
276. See Hebl, Tickle, & Heatherton, supra note 242, at 297 (evaluating evidence of
the persistence of stereotypes and presenting tentative data showing that "close social and
personal contact" may reduce stereotyping to the benefit of both non-stigmatized and
stigmatized individuals by reducing awkwardness). For purposes of increasing overall
social knowledge and civic capacity, the benefit to non-stigmatized individuals is
important, as is the presumed benefit to those handicapped by a stigma from experiencing
a full range of social experience.
277. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 ("Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair
the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to
express.").
278. In a recent incident at a law school, a program at the school sponsored a speech
on academic freedom by a speaker involved in a controversy. A group of professors from
another department arrived with flyers about the speaker's controversial statements and
placed them in the room. The flyers were confiscated by law professors, who told their
Confidential
inter-departmental colleagues that the flyers were "inflammatory."
conversation with a witness, Jan. 3, 2015. Despite strong norms favoring, the free
circulation of counter-speech in a law school, the reaction of some persons with whom I
spoke was, "I would not want anyone distributing flyers about me if I were a speaker."
Though stating the specific law governing the right in the particular circumstances of
listeners to provide flyers to others requires parsing of various elements of First
Amendment law, the prevalence of an impulse to rationalize suppression of academic
speech in a forum about academic freedom illustrates that groups, and individuals, often
prefer to silence critics within their near presence. See supra notes 153-63 and
accompanying text.
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melodrama by Oprah Winfrey about eating hamburgers. 2 ' To the
extent the silence principle gives legal backing to organizations'
impulses to silence dissenting speakers, or to make invisible those
who embody difference, the public culture of open exchange may well
be damaged-thus obstructing, rather than advancing, the goals of
the First Amendment. 81
Silence as an idea can be manipulated to good advantage in
discourse about Dale, but only by those with the resources to make
capital of silence as a topic of discussion or as a tactic. The merits of
silence can be best appreciated by those socially situated to discuss
silence in the abstract, to enforce silence by others, to project strength
28 2
through silence, or to claim a socially accepted "right to reticence.,
Generalizations about the value as a First Amendment precept of the
right not to speak about a subject at all are given voice by the Justices
and rationalized by other legal professionals. The context for these
positive generalizations is the social knowledge and speech resources
of opinion-makers situated to engage in playful experimentation with
the tropes of selective disclosure and meaningful silence that Dale
offers, or to idealize the benign effects of a right to exclude disfavored
groups from membership in large civic groups.
The enacting of discourse about Dale among legal academics is
like a play in which the players are given new tools by which to create
and signal meanings and in which they find mutual delight. The
advantage to law professors of the opportunity to try out voices in
which they control the vector of their own silences and thus enjoy
both "talk about talk" and an expressive "silence about silence" is a
benefit that also encourages a potentially costly habit of ironic
In the
distance in cultural discourse among opinion-makers.
borrowed terms of insistently empirical sociologists concerned to
describe "the reality of everyday life," First Amendment doctrines
may have their hardiest manifestation as "theoretical constructions of

279. Cohen v. California, 40 U.S. 15 (1971) (jacket worn to court bearing the words
"FUCK THE DRAFT" found to be protected). Elsewhere, police arrested Robert
Rudnick, whose van bore images of aborted fetuses. Thomas More Society Wins Defense
of Pro-Life Advocate's Free Speech Rights, THOMAS MORE SOCIETY (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/thomas-more-society-wins-defense-of-pro-life-advoca
tes-free-speech-rights/).
280. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000).
281. See infra Conclusion.
282. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 185, at 64.
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intellectuals and other merchants of ideas." 3 The effects occur at a
level of intellectual discourse that helps maintain openness of
exchange but with a problematic connection to maintaining similar
robustness at the ground level and in social life in communities and in
institutions that seize for institutional advantage conceived by
executives the management of silence.2 8 Indeed, a lack of critical
assessment of the effect of First Amendment doctrine on "everyday
life" may be the ultimate silence, one brought about by the
apportionment of intellectual focus, including that of law, to different
disciplinary sectors. Thus, in a silo created by prevailing judicial
techniques that contain a considerable element of formal doctrine"
powered by a metaphor about a market, the judicial craftsmen of
First Amendment doctrine participate in silence about unchosen,
imposed Silences in everyday life. The doctrine that makes these
silences seem both plausible and unheard is that of "the mere rational
The result is a
automaton.., espousing a bare scholasticism." '
failure to "divine the form of what lies confused and unexpressed...
28 7
and to bring to light the substance of what is half surmised.,
III. First Amendment Analysis and Silence:
Why Sociology Matters
A. Sociology First-An Empirical Paradigm for Jurisprudence

The view that empiricism is irrelevant has ample support in
prevailing First Amendment analysis, which gives first priority to
government neutrality in the regulation of speech.m
That view involves a crimped understanding of the regulatory
role that the First Amendment, as theorized by the Court over time,
283. BERGER & LUCKMAN, supra note 228, at 19. Baker also comments on the odd
popularity of the marketplace of ideas, given its "dependence on incorrect assumptions,"
and notes that "[slome cynics have suggested that really its popularity is primarily limited
to writers, academics, and other intellectuals who have a professional interest in
supporting faith in rational discussion and the intellectual pursuit of knowledge." BAKER,
supra note 105, at 17.
284. Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affirmative
Action Jurisprudence,and the Legacy of Racial Silence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1011, 1026 (2014).

285. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 155, at 41 (1993) (noting how "positive
law formalism . .. spares the lawyer or judge from a messy encounter with empirical
reality").
286.
287.

HAND, supra note 78, at 17.

288.

See FISS, supra note 170, at 19-22.

Id.
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plays in structuring speech distribution. If the Court blocks off
avenues to the creation of speech capital through access to greater
community engagement that legislators have sought to open up, the
Court is participating in allocating speech power 9 It is not simply
neutral. Large organizations, including the Scouts, gather economic
and social power through interactions with public resources and
informal assistance. In fact, the Boy Scouts has enjoyed considerable
assistance over time from government at every level, starting with the
chartering of the Boy Scouts as one of the only federally chartered
foundational civic groups in the United States, such as the American
Legion and the Red Cross.2' 9 The distribution of such associational
power is not pre-political. It is a product of complex behavioral
interactions over time between the state and organizations, customary
power allocated to sectors of society and often based on existing
hierarchies, and the mobilization of rules of inclusion and exclusion
that law has supported over time."' Indeed, with the Scouts, as the
formal laws excluding gay people from open service in government
and the military, and effectively confining gay people to the closet in
much of society, have been repealed or held unconstitutional, First
Amendment law as announced by Dale allows for a large, unselective
arm of majoritarian identities to maintain exclusion of gays on the
basis that the identity constitutes stigmatized expression. As a factual
matter, Dale privatizes the once de jure insistence upon silence.
Sociological investigation of the empirical significance of legally
protected organizational silence sharpens the legal analysis of the
silence principle. The jurisprudence of enforced silence in a group
289.

BAKER, supra note 105, at 15.

290. Government Funding of Boys Scouts' Discriminatory Policies Unacceptable,
SECULAR COALITION FOR AMERICA (July 19, 2012), https://secular.org/news/government

-funding-boys-scouts-discriminatory-policies-unacceptable (listing forms of government
assistance to the Boy Scouts).
291. Hierarchies that persist in private interactions through stereotyping were once
official government policy. Women were generally excluded from public life. The
obvious example of such formal exclusion is the refusal to admit women to practice as
lawyers, notoriously held constitutional in the famous case of Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
130 (1873). After slavery ended, African Americans lived subject to a pervasive legally
mandated segregation of housing, schooling, public parks, restaurants, hotels, and other
generally accessible accommodations for convenience, personal development, and leisure.
WILLIAM H. CHAFE, RAYMOND GAVINS, & ROBERT KORSTAD, REMEMBERING JIM
CROW: AFRICAN AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (2014).

For gay people, the exclusions from public life involved the need to conceal themselves
and to conform to the expectations of the majority, with constant threats to their liberty
and dignity from their exposure to criminal liability for associating with one another.
DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2013).
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comes with a dilemma internal to the conception of the First

Amendment. The speech and associational rights asserted by an
organization, such as the Scouts who claim a silence shield, confront
speech counter values on the side of the state interest in regulating
the Scouts' membership rules. The state interest is not only to
support anti-discrimination values.292
Rather, the state, in
promulgating anti-discrimination rules, is also supporting critical First
Amendment values that advance a robust citizenry prepared to
exercise autonomy as individuals and to express civic courage in
preference to helping enforce uniformity and fear within groups.293 In
the conception of the state as a promoter of First Amendment values
through anti-discrimination rules, the ideal social setting for the
production and transmission of expression is a free citizenry
possessed of speech capacity, confident of free access to widely
inclusive community groups, and unmarked by designations of
caste.294 A community with powerful, dominant groups empowered to
create out-castes is not a vital setting for the free and independent
citizenry that the First Amendment envisions.
Proponents of the "cooties doctrine" would assert that by forcing
the Scouts to accept members who impair their associational free
292. See FISS, supra note 170, at 15-26 (explaining that in contemporary free speech
controversies, such as hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance, free speech
interests as well as equal protection concerns constitute countervalues in support of state
regulation that augment other values, such as equal protection, that the state often cites in
support of regulation of speech).
293. Again, the theory of Erving Goffman on the social construction of reality and
hence of "fronts" that allow people to function in ways that seem to them to preserve their
self-esteem comments on how a robust citizenry might emerge from the complicated
interactions that a society organized in community groups and private associations
generates. In an interpretation of Goffman by Charles Lemert and Ann Branaman, a key
idea is that people are dependent on "access to structural resources and possession of
traits deemed desirable by the dominant culture.... [Slustaining a desirable self also
depends on possession of traits and attributes deemed by the dominant society to be
requisite of full-fledged humanity."). Ann Branaman, Goffman's Social Theory, in THE
GOFFMAN READER XLVI (Charles Lemert & Ann Branaman eds., 1997). While law
cannot necessarily intervene to corral the dominant society into integrating those whom it
stigmatizes into participation in the social understanding of "full-fledged humanity," the
efforts of legislatures can expand interactions in which those carrying a salient stigma may
develop a mastery of what Goffman calls "interaction ritual" and to contribute to what I
am calling civic capacity. The First Amendment has no mandate to prevent a greater
social range of experiences for constructing "a viable self" for citizenship. Rather, its
mission is to challenge the human instincts of revulsion against difference in identity or
expression.
294. BAKER, supra note 105, at 14 (explaining the importance for progress of "new
experiences and changes in everyday practice" and "the existence of a realm in which
people can have new or changed experiences").
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expression, the state is threatening First Amendment values. By
contrast, opponents assert that state deference to the expressive
silence of an organization inhibits the development of expressive

capacity in a segment of the citizenry. Although failing to interfere
with the Scouts' expressive choices is not state action and therefore
not a violation of the First Amendment,"' the broader view holds that
"fostering full and open debate ...

is a permissible end for the

state. ' 29 At a minimum, the claim that legally mandated silence in
local domains of organizational dominance enriches expression
deserves close scrutiny. Viewing the analytic structure of the asserted
right of organizational silence as a balancing of one First Amendment
claim against other expressive interests directs attention to neglected
questions about the distributional impact on overall expressive

capacity of legal protection for the silence principle and stresses the
need for an empirical investigation of the tradeoffs between the
expressive interests of an organization versus the interest in
developing expressive skill and confidence in the citizenry at large .

The notion that the silence principle is a protection for the expressive
society may falter, thus suggesting that whatever principles justify the
Boy Scouts decision are not deeply rooted in the First Amendment as
a protection for expressive capacity in the citizenry. Rather, the roots
are located in an ideologically mandated treatment of state power as

295. Id. at 16-17 (noting that claims that hate speech, pornography, and the
domination of political discourse by the rich in a manner that drowns out other voices
does not involve state action and thus cannot be treated as "inherently a violation of the
First Amendment (a claim that would require, as a purely technical matter, a showing of
state action)"). While state action is ordinarily attributed to the executive or the
legislature, the Supreme Court has on occasion treated the action of a state court as state
action. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that court enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action). The Supreme Court, as a logical
matter, could not hold its own doctrine to be state action that infringes on constitutional
rights. Yet the Court's veto of legislative measures intended to provide some aid to the
development of a robust citizenry competent to engage in First Amendment activities
might be seen as the Court frustrating the mission of the First Amendment by intervening
with an unempirical theory of the Amendment, thereby preventing the enhancement of
free expression through enhanced structural access for more citizens to constructing "a
viable self" for civil participation. For a judicial appeal to a constitutional basis in the First
Amendment for a constitutional right to an education, see Justice Marshall's dissent in San
Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
296. BAKER, supranote 105, at 17.
297. FISS, supra note 170 (arguing for a richer understanding of contemporary First
Amendment problems, with an understanding that in many instances, state power can be
an aid to the First Amendment values of fostering open debate).
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dangerous,298

and, at least in part for the Dale case, a specific concern
about the social volatility transmitted in the world of voluntary
associations by the cultural distaste (in 2000) for homosexuality.
The silence principle fits comfortably as a core rule about
government neutrality toward speech, which courts deploy as a
decision principle without regard to empirical effects."9 Neutrality of
the state is so critical, in this view, that it must not be judged by
identifying winners and losers in the silences protected on one side
and promoted on another. Before accepting that view, there should
be an understanding of the possible weight of the speech components
in the counter value and an understanding of the skewing of elite
opinion in assessments of the high First Amendment value of
associational expressive silence.
B. Winners and Losers: Talking about Dale and Being Dale in Everyday
Life
Dale illustrates the Court's attempt to manage silence by
imposing categorical legal rules that treat silence as a fixed and
desirable feature of social life, without an accompanying sociology of
silence.
Recognizing expressive silence as a positive First
Amendment value has a whole range of specific consequences
illustrated by Dale. These consequences include the gain of those
with discursive richness and outlets at their disposal to experimenting
with the expressive power of selective, chosen silence about identity
and with the symbolic significance of a constitutionally significant
expressive claim on silence. For others there is the raw presence of
"culturally destructive silence '' 3°' as a social force with meanings and
effects on everyday social life that block access to tactics for managing
silence as an expressive resource that are available among the most
articulate and well positioned to speak and be answered.
The Boy Scouts' choice of silence, as an abstraction, is expressive
and empowering to the Scouts-who already hold social power. The
silence is a conscious choice to present the Scouting organization in a
298. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (Kennedy, J.) (emphasizing that the First
Amendment is "[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power").
299. See FISS, supra note 170.
300. See STEVEN H. SCHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 5 (1990) (critiquing commentary on the First Amendment as "present[ing]
organizing visions that lack substantial connections to the demands of social reality").
301. Richard L. Johannesen, The Functions of Silence: A Plea for Communication
Research, 38 W. SPEECH 25, 28 (1947) (referring to George Steiner's view that there is a
breakdown in communication between and within fields of study).
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light-"conveying

a

view

of

the

situation"'

and

3 3 Silence
"safeguard[ing] [the] impression.""
at the corporate, or elite,
level is a form of expression through a tactic of meaningful silence." '
In the everyday life of the members, the "silence is expression"
principle may well shut down the expressive capacity of Boy Scouts
members, all of whom are drafted into a "dramaturgy" ' 5 of silence.
In these circumstances of discursive richness, shared in large part by
Scout executives, Supreme Court Justices, and academic
commentators, the complaisance about a view of silence within the
Scouts as a means of encouraging speech recalls a concern about the
need of legal institutions to accommodate newly expressed interests.
The concern was that the legal profession-judges and lawyers-is a
propertied class that was required in the mid-twentieth century after
long insulation to hear "other classes... [whose] demands are vocal
The insulated profession, it was
which before were dumb."3
suggested, might fail to reach "an understanding of and sympathy
with the purposes and ideals of those parts of the common society
whose interests are discordant with its own."' For the Dale case, the
propertied are those with forums and outlets for expression-the
legal and judicial professions. Those who before were "dumb"silent-are those for whom a stigma remained a barrier to social
contact, as it was before Dale and as it may remain for many living
unnoted in a society of discursive wealth.
The Dale case was a great success as a stimulus for the forum of
lively debate-indeed, in an unusually rich sense-but it is partly
useful in that way because of its lack of clarity and its failures in
everyday life either to generate associational experiences or to
release expressive energy. At the level of public debate and

302, GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 185, at 9, 14 (differentiating
from Goffman's use of the terms as directed at face-to-face interactions). Here, my usage
refers to impression management by an organization to facilitate wider consumption.
303. Id. at 14.
304. See GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 185 (discussing
Goffman's sociology of dramaturgy).
305. Id.
306. HAND, supranote 78, at 17.
307. Id. In her perceptive article about the disproportionate online targeting of
women who participate in social media, Anita Bernstein queries the lack of concern for
the silencing of women speakers on the internet by a barrage of threatening abuse, "[w]hy
has the trammeling of free speech gone so unnoticed?" She suggests that the many
sayings in various cultures calling for women to "shut up" has a connection to the lack of
interest by those not traditionally asked to shut up-males. Bernstein, supra note 114, at
122-25.
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exchange, the case throws the closet open for exit and offers it to all
comers for a managed retreat as well, showering discursive strategies
on scholars of every stripe, who may manipulate new choices about
claiming and deploying the hypothetically manifold expressive
identities harbored by all who speak. It symbolically affirms the
closet for spoiled identity but endorses its transparency and its open
doors for both entry and exit. In the immediate aftermath, as the
public culture made capital of a new topic, anyone with discursive
access could symbolically affirm that her identity was under siege,
construct a word portrait describing the conditions of confinement,
and enrich the public forum with the construction of a new claim to
an identity at risk or with a newly pregnant silence.
Dale helps maintain customary rules for managing social silences.
The affirmation of a silence strategy about homosexuality provides
support for re-imposing silence about well-known individuals who
have disclosed their sexuality: only they may speak of it, and they may
insist on the restoration of a silence to which their social power lays
claim.3 8 One can say, "I am gay," in public discourse, and survive
socially. But one should avoid saying, "You are gay," except with
clear permission.
The Dale principle confirms extraordinary
expressive choice to those speakers with the power to speak and then
to reclaim silence.
They may speak while bowing to Dale's
celebration of silence and thus avoiding the charge of flaunting, and
additionally using its silence teaching as an offensive weapon to
manage and suppress subsequent discourse that may disrupt their
preferred management of a public "with" that unfolds over time.'
With the silence principles, discursively rich speakers can play with
revelation and concealment with little risk. In doing so, they may
indeed expand the range of their creative voice and deepen their
sense of possessing a confident persona through experimentation with
presentation of self. Indeed, public debate, in which the participants
deploy subtle changes in persona, may well have therapeutic effects
for the niche of speakers able to manipulate the silence principle in
forms of selective disclosure and concealment.
By contrast, in everyday life, the Scouting case reinforced the
walls of the closet that contain and restrain the developing expression

308.

See Michael Laris, Mention of Gay Daughtera Cheap Trick, Lynne Cheney Says,

WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlarticles/A31310-

20040ctl3.html.
309. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 217 (explaining a "with" is a party
of more than one whose members are perceived to be "together").
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of young Scouts, the social knowledge 31 0 of their peers, Scoutmasters
discovering a sexual identity contrary to the expressive claims of the
Scouts' corporate organization, and families that contain gay
members. A family, learning of the sexual identity of their young
Scout, may decline to discuss the news with neighbors, for fear of its
being made public and causing the expulsion of their child from a
social group critical to his emotional life. The Dale doctrine
squelched speech and reinstated the simplicity of former times, when
average gay people had only the discursive strategy of the closet, the
associated forms of "camp," and the silence of isolation, deepened by
depression and fear. Dale may well have validated unchosen
strategies of silence by leading those discovering that they carry a
stigma to internalize a notion that disfavored identities should be kept
under wraps.311 Recently, assertions have arisen that a new "political
correctness" has overwhelmed many settings and thereby requires
self-censorship by those with a core sense of identity or a set of ideas
that differ from the enforcers of correctness."2 Moreover, the social
preference for silence and conformity may creep into critical,
formative public settings-universities,3 13 law schools,314 and corporate
boards who enforce a strict script and respond to pressures to oust
anyone whose opinions receive wide, public, negative attention.3"' As
to gay people, the nearness of a universal right to marriage is fueling a
backlash, one presumably coming from those in enclaves that have

310. SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 158 (referring to "pluralistic ignorance" as a
consequence of legal protection for "sanctuaries" in which gay people share experience,
and hence knowledge, "unknown to many or most citizens").
311. See GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 185.
312. Jonathan Chait, How the Language Police are Perverting Liberalism, N.Y. MAG.
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.
html.
313. Colleen Flaherty, The Problem with Civility, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 9, 2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/09lberkeley-chancellor-angers-faculty-mem
bers-remarks-civility-and-free-speech (describing a trend among university administrators
to demand "civility" as a faculty norm and the concern of faculty that the vague claims
about proper expression in a university are "Orwellian").
314. See Confidential conversation with a witness, supra note 278 (describing an
incident in a law school in which faculty members reportedly prevented the circulation of
flyers on the grounds that they could be "inflammatory").
315. David Crary, Rachel Zoll, & Michael Liedtke, Mozilla CEO Resignation Raises
Free-Speech Issues, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/04/04/mozilla-ceo-resignation-free-speech/7328759/ (describing the resignation
under pressure of Brendan Eich as CEO of Mozilla because of his support for the anti-gay
marriage campaign in California several years before).
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used social custom and legal protection to seal themselves off from
contact with fellow citizens. 16
Despite such concerns, in discussions by legal elites, the Dale
case and its qualified holding on associational freedom has been
praised for fostering discursive richness. Before Dale, Professor
William Eskridge described a brilliant strategy that helped channel
debate usefully away from denigration and toward having
"contending groups ... demonstrate their respective appeals by

'
forming their own communities or cooperative projects."317
Yet the
concrete effect in everyday life of encouraging competition and
separation does not clearly enhance either individual freedom of
expression or its cousin, open social interchange. With respect to
Professor Eskridge, his law review article praising as brilliant the
Supreme Court's channeling of discourse into "silos" consumed 85
pages of closely set type -proving his point by admirable example!
As discussed above, it is likely that more people in local settings
choose to be silent or concealed as a result of the policy than choose
to be expressive. If so, they fall into an American tradition-that of
the outsider learning the lesson taught in the small enclaves of our
early life319 or that of a more general paranoia and caution in an
alienated common life.2 Indeed, one key argument is that the
Scouts' organizational silence is First Amendment expression, thus
placing on the scales of "expression" the total silence chosen by the
Scouts, against the silence demanded of gay Scouts by the Scouting

316. Jonathan Rauch, Red America's Anti-Gay Backlash, DAILY BEAST (June 15,
2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/15/red-america-s-anti-gay-backlash.
html ("Every day, it seems, brings another news story about a prominent anti-gay
statement or legal effort. If opponents of gay rights are supposed to be retreating into
oblivion, they missed the memo."). Despite assurances from religion-and-law expert
Doug Laycock, many have interpreted recent state laws written to protect religious beliefs
of business owners as a license for discrimination against newly visible, empowered gay
people. Michael Barbaro & Erik Eckholm, Indiana Law Denounced as Invitation to
DiscriminateAgainst Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/
28/us/politics/indiana-law-denounced-as-invitation-to-discriminate-against-gays.html.
317. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1407
(2000).
318. Id.
319. See supra notes 161-63.
320. Joseph Heller, The Office in Which I Work, in ROBERT COLES & ALBERT
LAFARGE, MINDING THE STORE: GREAT WRITING ABOUT BuSINESS FROM TOLSTOY

TO Now 65 (2008) ("I have a feeling that someone nearby is soon going to find out
something about me that will mean the end, although I can't imagine what that something

is.").
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organization's exercise of the rights conferred in Dale and the habit of
silence taught by the principle of the case, as relayed to those on the
ground. If the heavy silence of local banishments counts as speech,
the scales are set against expression in everyday life.
Conclusion
This Article has resurrected the Dale opinion in order to explore
the broader concerns the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence raises. A number of scholars have suggested that the
Court too often supports the interests of the powerful in controlling
discourse and, either indirectly or directly, allows their speech to
impose actual silence on the less powerful, or the weak, or to drown
out weak voices to create something very like silence. The Court
often pays tribute to the idea of "more speech" as the good sought by
the framers of the First Amendment, and by the jurisprudence of the
Court. Yet the principle of Dale, a right of a large civic organization
to reject disfavored associations and cast those rejected into a silence
imposed by isolation, comes to the aid of those with discursive power
and inflicts injury on the everyday life of those lacking power. This
aid to the powerful is a strange inversion of free speech jurisprudence
given its modern rationale in the fierce philosophy of life as being
worth little except as a battle, as embraced by Justice Holmes.
Notably, Justice Holmes envisioned a fair fight. He may have
had little sympathy for the losers in a battle, or for the weak, but the
old soldier would likely have viewed the aid to the powerful, allowed
to pose in the garb of the weak, as unsporting and unmanly. Justice
Holmes was not one to be seduced by a pleasing rhetoric that
promised a fight could work out well for everyone if the Court
sometimes worked one of the corners, and sometimes refereed. If it
was a fight, someone would, and should win. Holmes would not have
tried to handicap a fight-either by helping the powerful gain
advantage by posing as weak, or by lending a hand to the weak.
Needless to say, First Amendment law today is not a perfect
reflection of Holmes's personal philosophy. The market is not
conceived by the Court in the fierce language of battle, but one of
debate and deliberation. The market the Court envisions consists of
equally endangered carriers, both weak and strong, of expressive
needs and messages needed for democratic deliberation.
An
individual's vulnerability is no longer at the core of the doctrine.
Unlike Justice Holmes, Justice Stevens imagined the plight of the
weakest. In his dissent from a case permitting as constitutional a
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prison regulation depriving certain inmates of all secular written
materials and photographs, Stevens invoked the "the sovereign's duty
to treat prisoners in accordance with 'the ethical tradition that
accords respect to the dignity and worth of every individual.""'32 He
also invoked the mission of the First Amendment to protect access to
ideas as "central to the development and preservation of individual
identity. 3 22 In a brief passage in defense of core rights of prisoners as
human beings, Stevens combined a sociology of knowledge and
human development with an ideal untethered to ideas of battle.
Lamenting that "the rule comes perilously close to a state-sponsored
effort at mind control," Stevens proceeded to celebrate a First
Amendment that is not about battle, but rather one that owes its
provenance to the message on behalf of the weak when the Court
323 Stevens quoted
extended protection to a school child in Barnette.
3
2
4
the ode of Justice Jackson in Barnette, also quoted in Wooley v.
325 to the dignity and vulnerability that belong uniquely to
Maynard,
the individual: "The State may not "'invad[e] the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment of our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.' 32 6 Stevens thus,
unlike the Court's majority, would have allowed a precedent about
silence as dignity for a private individual sphere of thought and spirit
to protect the human need of powerless prisoners for access to
expressive materials. Also unlike the Court's majority, he would have
permitted the anti-discrimination law of New Jersey to serve its
purposes of helping to expand the civic space in which a young Scout
might strive to develop for himself and share with others "the sphere
of intellect and spirit" in which all might thrive.2 In Dale, he did not
detect a danger to the human dignity of the Scouting enterprise.
In the Dale world, Silence is blessed as speech, protection of
association is skewed toward maintaining barriers, and the rules in
everyday interactions for "talk" are intimidating. A less open society
provides us a vivid glimpse of silence wedded to identity segregation
as a cultural strategy: A portrait of female students in Saudi Arabia

321. Beard, 548 U.S. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539
U.S. 126, 138 (2003) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J., concurring).
322. Id. at 552.
323. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
324. Beard,548 U.S. 552.
325. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
326. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
327. Id.

Summer 2015]

FIRST AMENDMENT SILENCE

watching a male professor in another room and allowed to ask
questions only by telephone call to the professor. A professor
reported: "Sometimes the silence
was so unsettling.., that I'd shout
3 28
there?,'
anyone
is
'Hello,
out,
The broadest commitment of the American experiment, as
captured in the eloquence of Justice Robert Jackson on behalf of a
tiny minority threatened by power using forced speech to drive them
from a civic space, is to the open society. The open society is one in
which civic space is broadly shared, Silence is a name for a personal
election to preserve the spirit of a vulnerable individual from coercive
power, and expressive freedom advances a shared citizenship among
all who would speak, join, and learn. We, American citizens, are
here, above all, to engage with one another, to deepen our shared
knowledge, and to support the flourishing of civic capacity.

328. Elizabeth Rubin, A Saudi Response on Reform: Round Up the Usual Dissidents,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at § 4, p. 3.
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